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Regulation Design in Insurance Markets

Resource type
Authors/contributors
Title
Regulation Design in Insurance Markets
Abstract
Regulators often impose rules that constrain the behavior of market participants. We study the design of regulatory policy in an insurance market as a delegation problem. A regulator restricts the menus of contracts an informed firm is permitted to offer, the firm offers a permitted menu to each consumer, and consumers choose contracts from offered menus. If consumer types and firm signals are ordered in a way that reflects coverage need, the regulator can leverage the firm's information by forcing the firm to offer specified additional options on each menu. Several extensions illustrate the practical application of our results.
Publication
American Economic Review
Volume
113
Issue
10
Pages
2546-80
Date
2023-10
Citation
Bhaskar, D., McClellan, A., & Sadler, E. (2023). Regulation Design in Insurance Markets. American Economic Review, 113, 2546–2580.
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