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Results 15 resources
Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2010). New Approaches to Surveying Organizations. American Economic Review, 100, 105–109.
Bell, B. D., & Van Reenen, J. (2013). Extreme Wage Inequality: Pay at the Very Top. American Economic Review, 103, 153–157.
We provide new evidence on the growth in pay at the very top of the wage distribution in the United Kingdom. Sectoral decompositions show that workers in the financial sector have accounted for the majority of the gains at the top over the last decade. New results are also presented on the pay of CEOs in the United Kingdom. We show how improved measurement of pay points to a stronger pay-performance link than previously estimated. This link is stronger, and more symmetric, for those firms in which institutional investors play a larger role.
Bloom, N., Sadun, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2010). Does Product Market Competition Lead Firms to Decentralize? American Economic Review, 100, 434–438.
Bloom, N., Sadun, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2012). Americans Do IT Better: US Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle. American Economic Review, 102, 167–201.
US productivity growth accelerated after 1995 (unlike Europe's), particularly in sectors that intensively use information technologies (IT). Using two new micro panel datasets we show that US multinationals operating in Europe also experienced a "productivity miracle." US multinationals obtained higher productivity from IT than non-US multinationals, particularly in the same sectors responsible for the US productivity acceleration. Furthermore, establishments taken over by US multinationals (but not by non-US multinationals) increased the productivity of their IT. Combining pan-European firm-level IT data with our management practices survey, we find that the US IT related productivity advantage is primarily due to its tougher "people management" practices. (JEL D24, E23, F23, M10, M16, O30)
Bloom, N., Sadun, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2015). Do Private Equity Owned Firms Have Better Management Practices? American Economic Review, 105, 442–446.
Using an innovative survey measure of management practices on over 15,000 firms, we find private equity firms are better managed than government, family, and privately owned firms, and have similar management to publicly listed firms. This is true both in developed and developing countries. Looking at management practices in detail we find that private equity owned firms have strong people management practices (hiring, firing, pay, and promotions), but even stronger monitoring management practices (lean manufacturing, continuous improvement, and monitoring). Plant managers working in private equity owned firms also report greater autonomy from headquarters over sales, marketing, and new product introduction.
Aghion, P., Bergeaud, A., & Van Reenen, J. (2023). The Impact of Regulation on Innovation. American Economic Review, 113, 2894–2936.
We present a framework that can be used to assess the equilibrium impact of regulation on endogenous innovation with heterogeneous firms. We implement this model using French firm-level panel data, where there is a sharp increase in the burden of labor regulations on companies with 50 or more employees. Consistent with the model's qualitative predictions, we find a fall in the fraction of innovating firms just to the left of the regulatory threshold. Furthermore, we find a reduction in the innovation response of firms to demand shocks just below the threshold. Regulation reduces aggregate innovation by 5.7 percent.
Griffith, R., Harrison, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2006). How Special Is the Special Relationship? Using the Impact of U.S. R&D Spillovers on U.K. Firms as a Test of Technology Sourcing. American Economic Review, 96, 1859–1875.
We examine the "technology sourcing" hypothesis that foreign research labs located in the U.S. tap into U.S. R&D spillovers and improve home country productivity. We show that U.K. firms that established a high proportion of inventors based in the U.S. by 1990 benefited disproportionately from the growth of U.S. R&D stock over the next ten years. We estimate that U.S. R&D during the 1990s was associated with 5 percent higher Total Factor Productivity for U.K. manufacturing firms in 2000 (about $13 billion), with the majority of benefits accruing to firms with an innovative presence in the U.S. (JEL F23, O32, O33)
Aghion, P., Van Reenen, J., & Zingales, L. (2013). Innovation and Institutional Ownership. American Economic Review, 103, 277–304.
We find that greater institutional ownership is associated withmore innovation. To explore the mechanism, we contrast the "lazymanager" hypothesis with a model where institutional ownersincrease innovation incentives through reducing career risks. Theevidence favors career concerns. First, we find complementaritybetween institutional ownership and product market competition,whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts substitution. Second,CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturnswhen institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumentalvariables, policy changes, and disaggregating by type of institutionalowner, we argue that the effect of institutions on innovation is causal.(JEL G23, G32, L25, M10, O31, O34)
Garicano, L., Lelarge, C., & Van Reenen, J. (2016). Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France. American Economic Review, 106, 3439–3479.
We show how size-contingent laws can be used to identify the equilibrium and welfare effects of labor regulation. Our framework incorporates such regulations into the Lucas (1978) model and applies it to France where many labor laws start to bind on firms with 50 or more employees. Using population data on firms between 1995 and 2007, we structurally estimate the key parameters of our model to construct counterfactual size, productivity, and welfare distributions. We find that the cost of these regulations is equivalent to that of a 2.3 percent variable tax on labor. In our baseline case with French levels of partial real wage inflexibility, welfare costs of the regulations are 3.4 percent of GDP (falling to 1.3 percent if real wages were perfectly flexible downward). The main losers from the regulation are workers–and to a lesser extent, large firms–and the main winners are small firms.
Criscuolo, C., Martin, R., Overman, H. G., & Van Reenen, J. (2019). Some Causal Effects of an Industrial Policy. American Economic Review, 109, 48–85.
We exploit changes in the area-specific eligibility criteria for a program to support jobs through investment subsidies. European rules determine whether an area is eligible for subsidies, and we construct instrumental variables for area eligibility based on parameters of these rule changes. Areas eligible for higher subsidies significantly increased jobs and reduced unemployment. A ten-percentage point increase in the maximum investment subsidy stimulates a 10% increase in manufacturing employment. This effect exists solely for small firms: large companies accept subsidies without increasing activity. There are positive effects on investment and employment for incumbent firms but not Total Factor Productivity.