A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 15 resources
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Using 9,801 director appointments during 2003–2014, we document the dramatic impact of connections. Sixty-nine percent of new directors have professional ties to incumbent boards, a group representing 13 of all potential candidates. Consistent with facilitating coordination and reducing search costs, connections help boards bring in gender diversity, new skills, and new industry background. More complex firms and firms in more competitive environments tend to appoint connected directors and experience better market reactions and higher shareholder votes. Connections to incumbent CEOs, however, result in lower announcement returns and shareholder votes. We use death (merger)-induced network loss (gain) as instruments.
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Using a large sample of director elections, we document that shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and voting mechanisms. However, most variables, except meeting attendance and ISS recommendations, have little economic impact on shareholder votes—even poorly performing directors and firms typically receive over 90% of votes cast. Nevertheless, fewer votes lead to lower “abnormal” CEO compensation and a higher probability of removing poison pills, classified boards, and CEOs. Meanwhile, director votes have little impact on election outcomes, firm performance, or director reputation. These results provide important benchmarks for the current debate on election reforms.
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We document market anticipation of merger bids and show that less anticipated bids earn significantly higher announcement returns. Subsequent bidders in the industry experience significant and positive abnormal returns around the time of initial industry bid announcements. These results suggest that announcement period returns underestimate the wealth effects of bidding. After accounting for anticipation, bidding activity is, on average, a significant wealth-creating event. Moreover, bidders pursuing public targets increase shareholder wealth and bidders in stock swaps do not lose. These results contradict conventional wisdom. Our results shed light on the correct magnitude of acquisition returns and on the transfer of information throughout an industry around the time of an economic shock.
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Journals
Topic
- CEO (3)
- Director (3)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (3)
Resource type
- Journal Article (15)
Publication year
- Between 1900 and 1999 (8)
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Between 2000 and 2024
(7)
- Between 2000 and 2009 (4)
- Between 2010 and 2019 (2)
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Between 2020 and 2024
(1)
- 2022 (1)