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Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms
Resource type
Authors/contributors
- Akbarpour, Mohammad (Author)
- Dworczak, Piotr (Author)
- Kominers, Scott Duke (Author)
Title
Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms
Abstract
Many scarce public resources are allocated at below-market-clearing prices and sometimes for free. Such ?nonmarket? mechanisms sacrifice some surplus, yet they can potentially improve equity. We develop a model of mechanism design with redistributive concerns. Agents are characterized by a privately observed willingness to pay for quality, a publicly observed label, and a social welfare weight. A market designer controls allocation and pricing of a set of objects of heterogeneous quality and maximizes the expectation of a welfare function. The designer does not directly observe individuals? social welfare weights. We derive structural insights about the form of the optimal mechanism, leading to a framework for determining how and when to use nonmarket mechanisms.
Publication
Journal of Political Economy
Volume
132
Issue
6
Pages
1831-1875
Date
2024-06-01
DOI
ISSN
0022-3808
Accessed
2024-06-27
Extra
Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
Citation
Akbarpour, M., Dworczak, P., & Kominers, S. D. (2024). Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms. Journal of Political Economy, 132, 1831–1875.
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