A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
Year-End Tax Planning of Top Management: Evidence from High-Frequency Payroll Data
Resource type
Authors/contributors
- Kreiner, Claus Thustrup (Author)
- Leth-Petersen, S?ren (Author)
- Skov, Peer Ebbesen (Author)
Title
Year-End Tax Planning of Top Management: Evidence from High-Frequency Payroll Data
Abstract
Using Danish high-frequency payroll data and tax reform variation, we detect year-end tax avoidance among top managers. Five to seven percent of top managers exploit year-end tax planning strategies to save taxes. Around 30 percent of the top managers engaging in year-end tax avoidance do so by retiming bonus payments while the rest shift regular wage income. However, bonus timing is most tax-sensitive. When considering all of the top managers receiving a December bonus, we find that more than one-quarter retime the bonus payment, whereas only 5 percent of those not receiving a bonus shift regular wage income.
Publication
American Economic Review
Volume
104
Issue
5
Pages
154-58
Date
2014-05
Citation
Kreiner, C. T., Leth-Petersen, S., & Skov, P. E. (2014). Year-End Tax Planning of Top Management: Evidence from High-Frequency Payroll Data. American Economic Review, 104, 154–158.
Journals
Link to this record