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Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence From the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Resource type
Author/contributor
Title
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence From the Czech and Slovak Republics.
Abstract
The Czech and Slovak Republics' mass privatization scheme used voucher points distributed to the population and a competitive bidding process to change the governance of a large number of firms. Voucher prices and following secondary market prices are shown to depend upon the resulting ownership structures. The more concentrated ownership is, the higher prices are. High absolute ownership by a single domestic investor is associated with even higher voucher prices. The author finds some evidence that initially prices are relatively lower when a bank-sponsored investment fund has a relatively large stake in a firm. This suggests conflicts of interest.
Publication
The Journal of Finance
Volume
52
Issue
4
Pages
1641-58
Date
1997-09
Citation
Claessens, S. (1997). Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence From the Czech and Slovak Republics. The Journal of Finance, 52, 1641–1658.
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