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Topic
Publication year
Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources?
Resource type
Authors/contributors
- Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger (Author)
- Minton, Bernadette A. (Author)
- Pan, Carrie H. (Author)
Title
Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources?
Abstract
We investigate corporate governance experts' claim that it is detrimental to a firm to reappoint former CEOs as directors after they step down as CEOs. We find that more successful and more powerful former CEOs are more likely to be reappointed to the board multiple times after they step down as CEOs. Firms benefit, on average, from the presence of former CEOs on their boards. Firms with former CEO directors have better accounting performance, have higher relative turnover-performance sensitivity of the successor CEO, and can rehire their former CEO directors as CEOs after extremely poor firm performance under the successor CEOs.
Publication
Review of Financial Studies
Volume
24
Issue
10
Pages
3486-3518
Date
2011
Citation
Fahlenbrach, R., Minton, B. A., & Pan, C. H. (2011). Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources? Review of Financial Studies, 24, 3486–3518.
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