A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 172 resources
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This paper presents empirical evidence against the standard dichotomy in macroeconomics that separates growth from the volatility of economic fluctuations. In a sample of ninety-two countries as well as a sample of OECD countries, the authors find that countries with higher volatility have lower growth. The addition of standard control variables strengthens the negative relationship. The authors also find that government spending-induced volatility is negatively associated with growth even after controlling for both time- and country-fixed effects. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
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The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) theorem, which predicts that countries will export products that are made from factors in great supply, performs poorly. However, deviations from HOV follow pronounced patterns. Trade is missing relative to its HOV prediction. Also, rich countries appear scarce in most factors and poor countries appear abundant in all factors, a fact that squares poorly with the HOV prediction that abundant factors are exported. As suggested by the patterns, HOV is rejected empirically in favor of a modification that allows for home bias in consumption and international technology differences. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
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The persistence of cooperation in public-goods experiments has become an important puzzle for economists. This paper presents the first systematic attempt to separate the hypothesis that cooperation is due to kindness, altruism, or warm-glow from the hypothesis that cooperation is simply the result of errors or confusion. The experiment reveals that, on average, about half of all cooperation comes from subjects who understand free-riding but choose to cooperate out of some form of kindness. This suggests that the focus on errors and 'learning' in experimental research should shift to include studies of preferences for cooperation as well. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
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The authors review and provide motivation for a one-sector model of economic growth in which decisions about capital accumulation are made by a political process. If it is possible to commit for at least three periods into the future, then, for any feasible consumption plan, there is a perturbation that is majority-preferred to it. Furthermore, plans that minimize the maximum vote that can be obtained against them yield a political business cycle. If it is impossible to commit, voters select the optimal consumption plan for the median voter. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
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The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to conduct annual auctions of emission allowances. Under the discriminative auction rules, sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids. This paper studies an inverted version of this auction in which buyers face the same incentives as sellers in the EPA auction. Consistent with theoretical predictions, buyers bid above their valuation, auction outcomes are inefficient, and increasing the number of buyers increases bids. Buyers facing human opponents compete more aggressively than the risk-neutral prediction but bids do not differ systematically from this prediction when buyers face computerized Nash 'robots.' Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
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This paper examines how national income and trading opportunities interact to determine the level and incidence of world pollution. The authors find that free trade raises world pollution if incomes differ substantially across countries; if trade equalizes factor prices, human-capital-abundant countries lose from trade, while human-capital-scarce countries gain; international trade in pollution permits can lower world pollution even when governments' supply of permits is unrestricted; international income transfers may not affect world pollution or welfare; and attempts to manipulate the terms of trade with pollution policy leave world pollution unaffected. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.