A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 181 resources
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When a stabilization has significant distributional implications (e.g., tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit), socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups. The process leading to stabilization becomes a "war of attrition," each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden. The authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of "rational" delay and relate it to several political and economic variables. They motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.
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The authors present evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom that the persistence of price inflation is significantly higher under managed-exchange-rate regimes than under gold-based, fixed-exchange-rate regimes. These differences are also reflected in expectations-augmented Phillips curves. The authors use a two-country macro model, with forward-looking price setters, to demonstrate that higher monetary accommodation of inflation and exchange-rate accommodation of inflation differentials increase inflation persistence. The evidence does not contradict this hypothesis. It supports the hypothesis of forward-looking price setters and highlights the empirical significance of the Lucas critique. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.
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A new welfare-enhancing role is identified for a policy of export subsidization in a new-product industry. An export-subsidy policy promotes the (rational) perception that a high-quality export can be provided at a relatively low price. Thus, an export subsidy generates a first-order benefit to welfare by enabling a high-quality export to be sold at a less-distorted high price. The subsidy will also introduce distortions into the price of a low-quality export and the quality-selection process. Since these choices are initially undistorted, however, the export-country welfare loss arising from new distortions is of second-order importance. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.
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The results from a randomized experiment conducted at the American Economic Review on the effects of double-blind versus single-blind peer reviewing on acceptance rates and referee rating indicate that acceptance rates are lower and referees are more critical when the reviewer is unaware of the author's identity. These patterns are not significantly different between female and male authors. Authors at top-ranked universities and at colleges and low-ranked universities are largely unaffected by the different reviewing practices, but the authors at near-top-ranked universities and at nonacademic institutions have lower acceptance rates under double-blind reviewing. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.
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Recent laboratory studies of alternating-offer bargaining find many empirical regularities that are inconsistent with the standard theory. In this paper, the author postulates that bargainers behave as if they are negotiating over both "absolute" and "relative" money. Absolute money is measured by cash, relative money by the disparity between absolute measures. The resulting model is consistent with previously observed regularities. New experiments provide further support as well as evidence against several alternative explanations. Also finding some support is an extension that predicts that the equilibrium of the standard theory will be observed when bargaining is done in a "tournament" setting. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.