A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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Results 174 resources
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This paper presents an experimental test of the proposition that government contributions to public goods, funded by lump-sum taxation, will completely crowd out voluntary contributions. It is found that crowding-out is incomplete and that subjects who are taxed are significantly more cooperative. This is true even though the tax does not affect the Nash equilibrium prediction. This result is taken as evidence for alternative models that assume people experience some private benefit from contributing to public goods. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
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In models of steady investment-driven growth, an individual's propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production ('capital') rather than from nonaccumulated factors. When agents are heterogeneous in this respect, growth-oriented policies have distributional consequences and, in the absence of lump-sum redistribution, their implementation faces political constraints. If the median voter is capital-poor relative to the economy's representative agent, political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital's income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
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The authors explain the use of legally unenforceable, discretionary financial contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable contracts are feasible. A discretionary contract allows a contracting party to choose whether or not to honor the contract. It is shown that such a contract liquefies reputational capital by permitting it to be depreciated in exchange for the preservation of financial capital and information reusability in financially impaired states. In addition, discretionary contracts foster the development of reputation. This explains discretion among highly confident letters, holding-company relationships, mutual-fund contracts, bank loan commitments, and other financial and nonfinancial contracts. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
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Endogenous-growth theory suggests that technological change tends to reinforce the position of the leading nations. Yet sometimes this leadership role shifts. The authors suggest a mechanism that explains this pattern of 'leapfrogging' as a response to occasional major changes in technology. When such a change occurs, the new technology does not initially seem to be an improvement for leading nations, given their extensive experience with older technologies. Lagging nations have less experience; the new technique allows them to use their lower wages to enter the market. If the new technique proves more productive than the old, leapfrogging of leadership occurs. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
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A key question concerning affirmative action is whether the labor-market gains it brings to minorities can continue without it becoming a permanent fixture in the labor market. The authors argue that this depends on how the policy affects employers' beliefs about the productivity of minority workers. They study the joint determination of employer beliefs and worker productivity in a model of statistical discrimination in job assignments. The authors prove that, even when identifiable groups are equally endowed ex ante, affirmative action can bring about a situation in which employers (correctly) perceive the groups to be unequally productive, ex post. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
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This paper provides experimental evidence on forward induction as a refinement criterion. In the basic extensive form, one of the two players chooses to play a battle-of-the-sexes game or to receive a certain payoff. According to forward induction, choosing to play the game is a signal about intended action. Though the presence of the outside option changes play, the authors find only limited support for the forward-induction hypothesis. The effects of the outside option also reflect the creation of a focal point through the asymmetry created by offering the outside option to one of the two players. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
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The authors derive and investigate empirically arbitrage pricing restrictions among three bonds of RJR Nabisco Holdings Capital Corporation. The three RJR bonds are virtually identical in all respects except for the form in which interest is paid. The authors document large and persistent errors in the market pricing of the three bonds over a two-year period. The cash-paying bond was consistently more expensive than either the pay-in-kind or deferred-coupon bonds. The magnitude of the pricing errors is too large to be explained by market imperfections. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.