A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 160 resources
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In all industrial countries, fiscal policy is increasingly about redistribution. In this paper, the authors study redistribution across different types of agents in a world characterized by the presence of labor unions and distortionary taxation. They show that an increase in transfers financed by distortionary taxation has nonlinear effects on unit labor costs relative to the other countries, depending on the degree of centralization of the wage-setting process in the labor market. The authors find considerable empirical support for the model in a sample of fourteen OECD countries. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
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When a series of individuals with private information announce public predictions, initial conformity can create an 'information cascade' in which later predictions match the early announcements. This paper reports an experiment in which private signals are draws from an unobserved urn. Subjects make predictions in sequence and are paid if they correctly guess which of two urns was used for the draws. If initial decisions coincide, then it is rational for subsequent decisionmakers to follow the established pattern, regardless of their private information. Rational cascades formed in most periods in which such an imbalance occurred. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
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The authors develop a model in which states may choose to form coalitions to capture efficiency gains from policy coordination. Joining a coalition entails setting the policy variable to maximize the coalition's aggregate payoff at a Nash equilibrium against nonmembers and to commit to a transfer scheme to share the gains. With two states, the unique equilibrium structure is complete federation; with more than two states, incomplete federation can be the unique equilibrium. Interpreting this result in terms of custom unions, the trend to trading-bloc formation may be equilibrium behavior even with cooperation and transfers within customs unions. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
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The authors examine the social costs of asymmetric-information-induced bank panics in an environment without government deposit insurance. Their case study is the Chicago bank panic of June 1932. The authors compare the ex ante characteristics of panic failures and panic survivors. Despite temporary confusion about bank asset quality on the part of depositors during the panic, which was associated with widespread depositor runs and bank stock price declines, the panic did not produce significant social costs in terms of failures among solvent banks. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
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This paper develops a computable general equilibrium model in which endogenous agency costs can potentially alter business-cycle dynamics. A principal conclusion is that the agency-cost model replicates the empirical fact that output growth displays positive autocorrelation at short horizons. This hump-shaped output behavior arises because households delay their investment decisions until agency costs are at their lowest–a point in time several periods after the initial shock. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
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This paper shows that, in several U.S. manufacturing industries, the seasonal variability of production and inventories varied with the state of the business cycle. The authors present a simple model which implies that, if firms reduce the seasonal variability of their production as the economy strengthens and they either hold constant or increase the stock of inventories they bring into the high-production seasons of the year, then they must be facing upward-sloping and convex marginal cost curves. The authors conclude that firms in a number of industries face upward-sloping and convex marginal-production-cost curves. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
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In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. The authors develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes. The benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president's powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system. The authors' model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.