A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
Your search
Results 84 resources
-
We use loan-level data to examine how large international banks reduced their cross-border lending after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Country, firm, and bank fixed effects allow us to disentangle credit supply and demand and to simultaneously control for the unobserved traits of banks and the countries and firms they lend to. We document substantial heterogeneity in the extent to which different banks retrenched from the same country. Banks reduced credit less to markets that were geographically close; where they were more experienced; where they operated a subsidiary; and where they were integrated into a network of domestic co-lenders.
-
This paper derives and analyzes dynamic timing strategies of a fund manager with private information. Endogenous timing strategies generated by various information structures and skills, and associated fund styles, are identified. Endogenous fund returns are characterized in the public information of an uninformed observer. Timing components are identified. The paper provides foundations for regression analyses of fund returns and tests of market timing.
-
Using proprietary energy futures position data, we provide evidence that mean hedger profits are negative whereas speculator (especially hedge fund) profits are positive, that traders (whether speculators or hedgers) who hold net positions opposite in sign to likely hedgers in aggregate have higher profits than traders whose net positions align with likely hedgers, and that profits on long positions vary inversely with inventories and directly with price volatility. These findings are consistent with the risk premium, hedging pressure, and modern theory of storage hypotheses, respectively. Further, our findings suggest that commodity futures momentum may be due largely to hedging pressure.
-
We analyze the efficiency of indexing executive pay by calibrating the standard compensation model to a large sample of U.S. CEOs. The benefits from indexing the strike price of options are small, and fully indexing all options would increase compensation costs by 50% for most firms. Indexing has several effects with overall ambiguous outcome; the quantitatively most important effect is to reduce incentives, because indexed options pay off when CEOs' marginal utility is low. The results also hold if CEOs can extract rents and extend to the case of indexing shares. Our findings may justify the common practice of "pay-for-luck."
-
Observable covariates are useful for predicting default, but several studies question their value for explaining credit spreads. We introduce a discrete-time no-arbitrage model with observable covariates, which allows for a closed-form solution for the value of credit default swaps (CDS). The default intensity is a quadratic function of the covariates, specified such that it is always positive. The model yields economically plausible results in terms of fit, the economic impact of the covariates, and the prices of risk. Risk premiums are large and account for a smaller percentage of spreads for firms with lower credit quality. Macroeconomic and firm-specific information can explain most of the variation in CDS spreads over time and across firms, even with a parsimonious specification. These findings resolve the existing disconnect in the literature regarding the value of observable covariates for credit risk pricing and default prediction.
-
This paper demonstrates a positive effect of stock liquidity on blockholder governance. Liquidity increases the likelihood of block formation. Conditional upon acquiring a stake, liquidity reduces the likelihood that the blockholder governs through voice (intervention)–as shown by the lower propensity for active investment (filing Schedule 13D) than passive investment (filing Schedule 13G). The lower frequency of activism does not reflect the abandonment of governance, but governance through the alternative channel of exit (selling one's shares): A 13G filing leads to positive announcement returns and improvements in operating performance, especially in liquid firms. Moreover, taking into account the increase in block formation, liquidity has an unconditional positive effect on voice as well as exit. We use decimalization as an exogenous shock to liquidity to identify causal effects.
-
CEOs with large networks earn more than those with small networks. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases compensation by about $17,000 on average, more so for "important" members, such as CEOs of big firms. Pay-for-connectivity is unrelated to several measures of corporate governance, evidence in favor of an efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.
-
We formulate a model of utility for a continuous-time framework that captures aversion to ambiguity about both volatility and drift. Corresponding extensions of some basic results in asset pricing theory are presented. First, we derive arbitrage-free pricing rules based on hedging arguments. Because ambiguous volatility implies market incompleteness, hedging arguments determine prices only up to intervals. In order to obtain sharper predictions, we apply the model of utility to a representative agent endowment economy and study equilibrium asset returns. A version of the consumption capital asset pricing model is derived, and the effects of ambiguous volatility are described.
-
This paper demonstrates how the principal-agent problem between venture capitalists and their investors (limited partners) causes limited partner returns to depend on diversifiable risk. Our theory shows why the need for investors to motivate VCs alters the negotiations between VCs and entrepreneurs and changes how new firms are priced. The three-way interaction rationalizes the use of high discount rates by VCs and predicts a correlation between total risk and net of fee investor returns. We take our theory to a unique data set and find empirical support for the effect of the principal-agent problem on equilibrium private equity asset prices.
-
Bank-affiliated private equity groups account for 30% of all private equity investments. Their market share is highest during peaks of the private equity market, when the parent banks arrange more debt financing for in-house transactions yet have the lowest exposure to debt. Using financing terms and ex post performance, we show overall that banks do not make superior equity investments to those of stand-alone private equity groups. Instead, they appear to expand their private equity engagement to take advantage of the credit market booms, while capturing private benefits from cross-selling of other banking services.
Explore
Journals
Topic
- CEO (7)
- Bond (7)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (3)
- Director (3)
- Capital Structure (2)
Resource type
- Journal Article (84)