A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

• Broadie, M., Chernov, M., & Johannes, M. (2009). Understanding Index Option Returns. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 4493–4529.

  Previous research concludes that options are mispriced based on the high average returns, CAPM alphas, and Sharpe ratios of various put selling strategies. One criticism of these conclusions is that these benchmarks are ill suited to handle the extreme statistical nature of option returns generated by nonlinear payoffs. We propose an alternative way to evaluate the statistical significance of option returns by comparing historical statistics to those generated by option pricing models. The most puzzling finding in the existing literature, the large returns to writing out-of-the-money puts, is not inconsistent (i.e., is statistically insignificant) relative to the Black-Scholes model or the Heston stochastic volatility model due to the extreme sampling uncertainty associated with put returns. This sampling problem can largely be alleviated by analyzing market-neutral portfolios such as straddles or delta-hedged returns. The returns on these portfolios can be explained by jump risk premiums and estimation risk.

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• Brophy, D. J., Ouimet, P. P., & Sialm, C. (2009). Hedge Funds as Investors of Last Resort? Review of Financial Studies, 22, 541–574.

  Hedge funds have become important investors in public companies raising equity privately. Hedge funds tend to finance companies that have poor fundamentals and pronounced information asymmetries. To compensate for these shortcomings, hedge funds protect themselves by requiring substantial discounts, negotiating repricing rights, and entering into short positions of the underlying stocks. We find that companies that obtain financing from hedge funds significantly underperform companies that obtain financing from other investors during the following two years. We argue that hedge funds are investors of last resort and provide funding for companies that are otherwise constrained from raising equity capital.

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• Brunnermeier, M. K., & Pedersen, L. H. (2009). Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2201–2238.

  We provide a model that links an asset's market liquidity (i.e., the ease with which it is traded) and traders' funding liquidity (i.e., the ease with which they can obtain funding). Traders provide market liquidity, and their ability to do so depends on their availability of funding. Conversely, traders' funding, i.e., their capital and margin requirements, depends on the assets' market liquidity. We show that, under certain conditions, margins are destabilizing and market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing, leading to liquidity spirals. The model explains the empirically documented features that market liquidity (i) can suddenly dry up, (ii) has commonality across securities, (iii) is related to volatility, (iv) is subject to "flight to quality," and (v) co-moves with the market. The model provides new testable predictions, including that speculators' capital is a driver of market liquidity and risk premiums.

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• Bunkanwanicha, P., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2009). Big Business Owners in Politics. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2133–2168.

  This paper investigates a little studied but common mechanism that firms use to obtain state favors: business owners themselves seeking election to top office. Using Thailand as a research setting, we find that the more business owners rely on government concessions or the wealthier they are, the more likely they are to run for top office. Once in power, the market valuation of their firms increases dramatically. Surprisingly, the political power does not influence the financing strategies of their firms. Instead, business owners in top offices use their policy-decision powers to implement regulations and public policies favorable to their firms. Such policies hinder not only domestic competitors but also foreign investors. As a result, these politically connected firms are able to capture more market share.

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• Butler, A. W., Fauver, L., & Mortal, S. (2009). Corruption, Political Connections, and Municipal Finance. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2673–2705.

  We show that state corruption and political connections have strong effects on municipal bond sales and underwriting. Higher state corruption is associated with greater credit risk and higher bond yields. Corrupt states can eliminate the corruption yield penalty by purchasing credit enhancements. Underwriting fees were significantly higher during an era when underwriters made political contributions to win underwriting business. This pay-to-play underwriting fee premium exists only for negotiated bid bonds where underwriting business can be allocated on the basis of political favoritism. Overall, our results show a strong impact of corruption and political connections on financial market outcomes.

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• Cao, H. H., & Ou-Yang, H. (2009). Differences of Opinion of Public Information and Speculative Trading in Stocks and Options. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 299–335.

  We analyze the effects of differences of opinion on the dynamics of trading volume in stocks and options. We find that disagreements about the mean of the current- and next-period public information lead to trading in stocks in the current period but have no effect on options trading. Without options, we find that disagreements about the precision of all past and current public information affect trading in stocks in the current period. With options, only disagreements about the precisions of the next- and current-period information affect stocks and options trading in the current period. Our results suggest that options trading is concentrated around information events that are likely to cause disagreements among investors, whereas trading in stocks may be diffusive over many periods.

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• Carr, P., & Wu, L. (2009). Variance Risk Premiums. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 1311–1341.

  We propose a direct and robust method for quantifying the variance risk premium on financial assets. We show that the risk-neutral expected value of return variance, also known as the variance swap rate, is well approximated by the value of a particular portfolio of options. We propose to use the difference between the realized variance and this synthetic variance swap rate to quantify the variance risk premium. Using a large options data set, we synthesize variance swap rates and investigate the historical behavior of variance risk premiums on five stock indexes and 35 individual stocks.

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• Caskey, J. A. (2009). Information in Equity Markets with Ambiguity-Averse Investors. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 3595–3627.

  This paper shows that persistent mispricing is consistent with a market that includes ambiguity-averse investors. In particular, ambiguity-averse investors may prefer to trade based on aggregate signals that reduce ambiguity at the cost of a loss in information. Equilibrium prices may therefore fail to impound publicly available information. While this creates profit opportunities for ambiguity-neutral investors, ambiguity-averse investors perceive that the benefit of ambiguity reduction outweighs the cost of trading against investors who have superior information. The model can explain both underreaction, such as that evident in postearnings announcement drifts and momentum, and overreaction to accounting accruals.

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• Chan, L. K. C., Dimmock, S. G., & Lakonishok, J. (2009). Benchmarking Money Manager Performance: Issues and Evidence. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 4553–4599.

  Academic and practitioner research evaluates portfolio performance using size and value/growth attributes or factors. We assess the merits of popular evaluation procedures based on matched-characteristic benchmark portfolios or time-series return regressions by applying them to a sample of active money managers and passive indexes. Estimated abnormal returns display large variation across approaches. The benchmarks typically used in academic research–attribute-matched portfolios from independent sorts, the three-factor time-series model, and cross-sectional regressions of returns on stock characteristics–track returns poorly. Some simple alterations improve the performance of these methods.

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• Chava, S., Livdan, D., & Purnanandam, A. (2009). Do Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost of Bank Loans? Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2973–3004.

  Using a large sample of bank loans issued to U.S. firms between 1990 and 2004, we find that lower takeover defenses (as proxied by the lower G-index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003) significantly increase the cost of loans for a firm. Firms with lowest takeover defense (democracy) pay a 25% higher spread on their bank loans as compared with firms with the highest takeover defense (dictatorship), after controlling for various firm and loan characteristics. Further investigations indicate that banks charge a higher loan spread to firms with higher takeover vulnerability mainly because of their concern about a substantial increase in financial risk after the takeover. Our results have important implications for understanding the link between a firm's governance structure and its cost of capital. Our study suggests that firms that rely too much on corporate control market as a governance device are punished by costlier bank loans.

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