A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 84 resources
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Firms routinely justify CEO compensation by benchmarking against companies with highly paid CEOs. We examine whether the 2006 regulatory requirement of disclosing compensation peers mitigated firms' opportunistic peer selection activities. We find that strategic peer benchmarking did not disappear after enhanced disclosure. In fact, it intensified at firms with low institutional ownership, low director ownership, low CEO ownership, busy boards, large boards, and non-intensive monitoring boards, and at firms with shareholders complaining about compensation practices. The effect is also stronger at firms with new CEOs. These findings call into question whether disclosure regulation can remedy potential problems in compensation practices.
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In a large panel of Compustat firms, we find that firm policy changes after exogenous CEO departures do not display abnormally high levels of variability, casting doubt on the presence of idiosyncratic-style effects in policy choices. After endogenous CEO departures, we do detect abnormally large policy changes. These changes are larger when the firm is likely to draw from a deeper pool of replacement CEO candidates, suggesting the presence of causal-style effects that are anticipated by the board. Our evidence suggests that managerial styles are not transferred across employers and that standard F-tests are inappropriate for identifying style effects.
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This paper challenges the widely accepted stylized fact that chief executive officers (CEOs) in the United States are paid significantly more than their foreign counterparts. Using CEO pay data across fourteen countries with mandated pay disclosures, we show that the U.S. pay premium is economically modest and primarily reflects the performance-based pay demanded by institutional shareholders and independent boards. Indeed, we find no significant difference in either level of CEO pay or the use of equity-based pay between U.S. and non-U.S. firms exposed to international and U.S. capital, product, and labor markets. We also show that U.S. and non-U.S. CEO pay has largely converged in the 2000s.
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In recent decades U.S. households have experienced residential house prices moving persistently, that is, returns being positively serially correlated. We set up a realistically calibrated life cycle model with slow-moving time variation in expected housing returns, showing that not only age, labor income, and pre-existing housing wealth but also the state of the housing market significantly affect household decisions. Consistently with the data, the model predicts that in good states of housing market cycles (1) homeownership rates increase, (2) households buying homes invest a larger share of their net worth in their home, and (3) these households lever up more.
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A mortgage program that offered borrowers greater flexibility in the timing of repayments increased a bank's volume by over 35%. Loans in the program exhibited superior performance. Despite this, a regression discontinuity analysis shows that the causal impact of offering flexibility was to attract borrowers to the bank who experienced quadruple the average delinquency rate. These contrasting findings are driven by the fact that the bank engaged in ex post sorting of stronger borrowers into the flexible program. This sorting masked the ex ante adverse selection effects that offering flexibility had on the entire borrowing pool.
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This paper examines whether unobservable differences in firm volatility are responsible for the global loan pricing puzzle, which is the observation that corporate loan interest rates appear to be lower in Europe than in the United States. We analyze whether equity volatility, an error prone measure of firm volatility, can explain this difference in loan spreads. We show that using equity volatility in OLS regressions will result in biased and inconsistent estimates of the difference in U.S. and European loan spreads. We use instrumental variable methods to identify consistent estimates and find no difference in U.S. and European loan spreads.
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In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. We show that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes coexist–one class fully concentrated and with control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights–removes the controlling creditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and the performance of floating charge financing, which refers to debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entire business as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency of contractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.
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This paper assesses the impact of the geographic diversification of bank holding company (BHC) assets across the United States on their market valuations. Using two new identification strategies based on the dynamic process of interstate bank deregulation, we find that exogenous increases in geographic diversity reduced BHC valuations. We also find that the geographic diversification of BHC assets increased insider lending and reduced loan quality. Taken together, these findings are consistent with theories predicting that geographic diversity intensifies agency problems.
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We study the simultaneous impact of fiscal policy decisions on macroeconomic activity, wealth distribution, and asset prices. We consider a general equilibrium, overlapping generations model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents, where government debt and capital are imperfect substitutes. Increases in public debt lead to significant increases in the riskless rate and to a reduction in the equity premium, while higher capital income tax rates lead to a higher equity premium. The crowding-out effects (on capital and output) are much higher than in models where government debt and capital are perfect substitutes, which thus ignore households' portfolio reallocation decisions.
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We show that the credit quality of corporate debt issuers deteriorates during credit booms and that this deterioration forecasts low excess returns to corporate bondholders. The key insight is that changes in the pricing of credit risk disproportionately affect the financing costs faced by low-quality firms, so debt issuance of low-quality firms is particularly useful for forecasting bond returns. We show that a significant decline in issuer quality is a more reliable signal of credit market overheating than rapid aggregate credit growth. We use these findings to investigate the forces driving time variation in expected corporate bond returns.
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Journals
Topic
- CEO (7)
- Bond (7)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (3)
- Director (3)
- Capital Structure (2)
Resource type
- Journal Article (84)