A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 141 resources
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We study how private equity buyouts create value in higher education, a sector with opaque product quality and intense government subsidy. With novel data on 88 private equity deals involving 994 schools, we show that buyouts lead to higher tuition and per-student debt. Exploiting loan limit increases, we find that private equity-owned schools better capture government aid. After buyouts, we observe lower education inputs, graduation rates, loan repayment rates, and earnings among graduates. Neither school selection nor student body changes fully explain the results. The results indicate that in a subsidized industry, maximizing value may not improve consumer outcomes.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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We examine the determinants of vertical acquisitions using product text linked to product vocabulary from input-output tables. We find that the innovation stage is important in understanding vertical integration. R&D-intensive firms are less likely to become targets of vertical acquisitions. In contrast, firms with patented innovation are more likely to sell to vertically related buyers. Firms’ R&D intensity is a more important deterrent to their vertical acquisitions when the provision of innovation incentives by potential acquirers is more difficult. The role of patents in fostering vertical acquisitions is more prevalent when potential buyers face a higher risk of holdup. (JEL G32, G34, L22, L25, O34)
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We construct and analyze the equilibrium of a model of delegated portfolio management in which money managers signal their investment skills via fund transparency. To lower the costs of transparency, high-skill managers rely on their performance to separate from low-skill managers over time. In contrast, medium-skill managers rely on transparency to separate, especially when it is difficult for investors to tell them apart through performance alone. Low-skill managers mimic high-skill managers in opaque funds, hoping to replicate their performance and compensation. The model yields several novel empirical predictions that contrast transparent and opaque funds.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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We analyze communications between the SEC and firms prior to IPOs using LDA analysis and KL divergence. The SEC’s concerns closely map onto the regulator’s stated mandate: companies increase prospectus disclosures on precise topics of SEC concern. Revenue recognition is the dominant topic of SEC concern, and it is not independently discovered by investors. Increased SEC concern about it is associated with greater secondary sales, lower post-IPO liquidity, lower post-IPO returns, and a higher probability of withdrawal. The regulator’s role during the capital raising process results in increased transparency but contributes to delays in the going public process.
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This paper studies how access to financial services among a previously unbanked group affects human capital, labor market, and wealth outcomes. We use novel data from the Freedman’s Savings Bank—created following the American Civil War to serve free Blacks—employing an instrumental variables strategy exploiting the staggered rollout of bank branches. Families with accounts are more likely to have children in school, be literate, work, and have higher occupational income, business ownership, and real estate wealth. Placebo effects are not present using planned but unbuilt branches, or for Whites, suggesting significant positive effects of financial inclusion.
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I find that shadow bank money creation significantly expands during monetary-tightening cycles. This “shadow banking channel” offsets reductions in commercial bank deposits and dampens the impact of monetary policy. Using a structural model of bank competition, I show that the difference in depositor clienteles quantitatively explains banks’ different responses to monetary policy. Facing a more yield-sensitive clientele, shadow banks are more likely to pass through rate hikes to depositors, thereby attracting more deposits when the Federal Reserve raises rates. My results suggest that monetary tightening could unintentionally increase financial fragility by driving deposits into the uninsured shadow banking sector.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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We study the effects of policies proposed to address “short-termism” in financial markets. We examine a noisy rational expectations model in which investors’ exposures and information about fundamentals endogenously vary across horizons. In this environment, taxing or outlawing short-term investment doesn’t negatively affect the information in prices about long-term fundamentals. However, such a policy reduces short- and long-term investors’ profits and utility. Changing policies about the release of short-term information can help long-term investors—an objective of some policy makers—at the expense of short-term investors. Doing so also makes prices less informative and increases costs of speculation.
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We exploit variation in demand induced by demographics to provide causal evidence of the precautionary motive of cash holdings. We show that firms significantly increase their cash levels in response to exogenous increases in investment opportunities. We also provide novel evidence of the dynamics of accumulation and use of cash. Financially constrained firms build their cash reserves using internal sources. Consequently, they start saving earlier and keep high cash levels longer. Unconstrained firms rely on external financing to both invest and build cash reserves, requiring them to save less and allowing them to incur lower costs of carry.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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We propose a theoretically motivated factor model based on investor psychology and assess its ability to explain the cross-section of U.S. equity returns. Our factor model augments the market factor with two factors that capture long- and short-horizon mispricing. The long-horizon factor exploits the information in managers’ decisions to issue or repurchase equity in response to persistent mispricing. The short-horizon earnings surprise factor, which is motivated by investor inattention and evidence of short-horizon underreaction, captures short-horizon anomalies. This 3-factor risk-and-behavioral model outperforms other proposed models in explaining a broad range of return anomalies.
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A common practice in the finance literature is to create characteristic portfolios by sorting on characteristics associated with average returns. We show that the resultant portfolios are likely to capture not only the priced risk associated with the characteristic but also unpriced risk. We develop a procedure to remove this unpriced risk using covariance information estimated from past returns. We apply our methodology to the five Fama-French characteristic portfolios. The squared Sharpe ratio of the optimal combination of the resultant characteristic-efficient portfolios is 2.13, compared with 1.17 for the original characteristic portfolios.
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Journals
Topic
- Bond (10)
- CEO (5)
- Director (3)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (2)
Resource type
- Journal Article (141)