A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

• Ait-Sahalia, Y. (1996). Testing Continuous-Time Models of the Spot Interest Rate. Review of Financial Studies, 9, 385–426.

  Different continuous-time models for interest rates coexist in the literature. We test parametric models by comparing their implied parametric density to the same density estimated nonparametrically. We do not replace the continuous-time model by discrete approximations, even though the data are recorded at discrete intervals. The principal source of rejection of existing models is the strong nonlinearity of the drift. Around its mean, where the drift is essentially zero, the spot rate behaves like a random walk. The drift then mean-reverts strongly when far away from the mean. the volatility is higher when away from the mean.

• Anderson, R. W., & Sundaresan, S. (1996). Design and Valuation of Debt Contracts. Review of Financial Studies, 9, 37–68.

  This article studies the design and valuation of debt contracts in a general dynamic setting under uncertainty. We incorporate some insights of the recent corporate finance literature into a valuation framework. The basic framework is an extensive form game determined by the terms of a debt contract and applicable bankruptcy laws. Debtholders and equityholders behave noncooperatively. The firm's reorganization boundary is determined endogenously. Strategic debt service results in significantly higher default premia at even small liquidation costs. Deviations from absolute priority and forced liquidations occur along the equilibrium path. The design tends to stress higher coupons and sinking funds when firms have a higher cash payout ratio.

• Bakshi, G. S., & Chen, Z. (1996). Inflation, Asset Prices, and the Term Structure of Interest Rates in Monetary Economies. Review of Financial Studies, 9, 241–275.

  This article offers a tractable monetary asset pricing model. In monetary economies, the price level, inflation, asset prices, and the real and nominal interest rates have to be determined simultaneously and in relation to each other. This link allows us to relate in closed form each of the dependent entities to the underlying real and monetary variables. Among other features of such economies, inflation can be partially nonmonetary and the real and nominal term structures can depend on fundamentally different risk factors. In one extreme, the process followed by the real term structure is independent of that followed by its nominal counterpart.

• Bates, D. S. (1996). Jumps and Stochastic Volatility: Exchange Rate Processes Implicit in Deutsche Mark Options. Review of Financial Studies, 9, 69–107.

  An efficient method is developed for pricing American options on stochastic volatility/jump-diffusion processes under systematic jump and volatility risk. The parameters implicit in deutsche mark (DM) options of the model and various submodels are estimated over the period 1984 to 1991 via nonlinear generalized least squares, and are tested for consistency with $/DM futures prices and the implicit volatility sample path. The stochastic volatility submodel cannot explain the "volatility smile" evidence of implicit excess kurtosis, except under parameters implausible given the time series properties of implicit volatilities.

• Bekaert, G. (1996). The Time Variation of Risk and Return in Foreign Exchange Markets: A General Equilibrium Perspective. Review of Financial Studies, 9, 427–470.

  This article successively introduces variable velocity, durability, and habit persistence in a standard two-country general equilibrium model and explores their effects on the variability of exchange rate changes, forward premiums, and the foreign exchange risk premium. A new feature of the model is that agents make decisions at a weekly frequency and face conditionally heteroskedastic shocks. Nevertheless, even the most complex model fails to deliver sufficiently variable risk premiums without causing forward premiums and exchange rates to be excessively variable. Unlike previous models, the model can roughly match the persistence of forward premiums.

• Berkman, H. (1996). Large Option Trades, Market Makers, and Limit Orders. Review of Financial Studies, 9, 977–1002.

  This article focuses on the difference between market makers and limit orders in their role as suppliers of liquidity. For both sources of liquidity I analyze the price behavior of stocks and options around large option trades and I estimate the premium paid by the initiator of the large trade. My findings suggest that limit orders for options are "picked off" after adverse changes in the underlying stock price. Furthermore, I find that for these transactions there is a permanent change in quotations in the direction of the transaction. After transactions where market makers supply liquidity, quotes tend to return to their pretrade level.

• Berkovitch, E., & Israel, R. (1996). The Design of Internal Control and Capital Structure. Review of Financial Studies, 9, 209–240.

  We study the design of internal control and capital structure. We pose the question, When is control allocated only to shareholders and when is it allocated to other stakeholders, such as debtholders, or the management team? We show that shareholders (debtholders) get control when the firm's cash flow is relatively sensitive (insensitive) to managerial effort. Our theory implies that the signs of the correlations between endogenous variables when shareholders have absolute control are reversed when debtholders have veto power. In particular, debt level and firm value are negatively (positively) correlated when debtholders have veto power (shareholders have absolute control).

• Berlin, M., John, K., & Saunders, A. (1996). Bank Equity Stakes in Borrowing Firms and Financial Distress. Review of Financial Studies, 9, 889–919.

  We derive the optimal financial claim for a bank when the borrowing firm's uninformed stake-holders depend on the bank to establish whether the firm is distressed and whether concessions by stakeholders are necessary. The bank's financial claim is designed to ensure that it cannot confide with a healthy firm's owners to seek unnecessary concessions or to collude with a distressed firm's owners to claim that the firm is healthy. To prove that a request for concessions has not come from a healthy firm/bank coalition, the bank must hold either a very small or a very large equity stake when the firm enters distress. To prove that a distressed firm and the bank have not colluded to claim that the firm is healthy, the bank may need to hold equity under routine financial conditions.

• Bhattacharya, S., & Padilla, A. J. (1996). Dynamic Banking: A Reconsideration. Review of Financial Studies, 9, 1003–1032.

  Financially intermediated and stock market consumption-investment avocations, with and without governmental interventions, are compared in a welfare sense in overlapping generation economies with (and without) shocks to agents' intertemporal preferences. We first show that, in economies with preference shocks, governmental interventions subject to the same informational requirements as those imposed on financial intermediaries, lead to stock market allocations that are not inferior to those attained under financial intermediation. Second, we argue that the necessary interventions are qualitatively no different from those required to implement stationary optimal allocations in OLG models without shocks to agents' intertemporal consumption preferences.

• Blake, C. R., Elton, E. J., & Gruber, M. J. (1996). Survivorship Bias and Mutual Fund Performance. Review of Financial Studies, 9, 1097–1120.

  Mutual fund attrition can create problems for a researcher because funds that disappear tend to do so due to poor performance. In this article we estimate the size of the bias by tracking all funds that existed at the end of 1976. When a fund merges we calculate the return, taking into account the merger terms. This allows a precise estimate of survivorship bias. In addition, we examine characteristics of both mutual funds that merge and their partner funds. Estimates of survivorship bias over different horizons and using different models to evaluate performance are provided.