A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

• Allayannis, G., & Ihrig, J. (2001). Exposure and Markups. Review of Financial Studies, 14, 805–835.

  This article examines how to properly specify and test for factors that affect exchange-rate exposure. Starting from theoretical underpinnings and a sample of U.S. manufacturing industries between 1979 and 1995, we find that 4 of 18 industry groups are significantly exposed to exchange-rate movements through the effect of industry competitive structure, export share, and imported input share. On average, a 1% appreciation of the dollar decreases the return of the average industry by 0.13%. Consistent with our model's predictions, as an industry's markups fall (rise), its exchange-rate exposure increases (decreases).

• Allayannis, G., & Weston, J. P. (2001). The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm Market Value. Review of Financial Studies, 14, 243–276.

  This article examines the use of foreign currency derivatives (FCDs) in a sample of 720 large U.S. nonfinancial firms between 1990 and 1995 and its potential impact on firm value. Using Tobin's Q as a proxy for firm value, we find a positive relation between firm value and the use of FCDs. The hedging premium is statistically and economically significant for firms with exposure to exchange rates and is on average 4.87% of firm value. We also find some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that hedging causes an increase in firm value.

• Alvarez, F., & Jermann, U. J. (2001). Quantitative Asset Pricing Implications of Endogenous Solvency Constraints. Review of Financial Studies, 14, 1117–1151.

  We study the asset pricing implications of an economy where solvency constraints are endogenously determined to deter agents from defaulting while allowing as much risk sharing as possible. We solve analytically for efficient allocations and for the corresponding asset prices, portfolio holdings, and solvency constraints for a simple example. Then we calibrate a more general model to U.S. aggregate as well as idiosyncratic income processes. We find equity premia, risk premia for long-term bonds, and Sharpe ratios of magnitudes similar to the U.S. data for low risk aversion and a low time-discount factor.

• Basak, S., & Shapiro, A. (2001). Value-at-Risk-Based Risk Management: Optimal Policies and Asset Prices. Review of Financial Studies, 14, 371–405.

  This article analyzes optimal, dynamic portfolio and wealth/consumption policies of utility maximizing investors who must also manage market-risk exposure using Value-at-Risk (VaR). We find that VaR risk managers often optimally choose a larger exposure to risky assets than non-risk managers and consequently incur larger losses when losses occur. We suggest an alternative risk-management model, based on the expectation of a loss, to remedy the shortcomings of VaR. A general-equilibrium analysis reveals that the presence of VaR risk managers amplifies the stock-market volatility at times of down markets and attenuates the volatility at times of up markets.

• Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (2001). The Many Faces of Information Disclosure. Review of Financial Studies, 14, 1021–1057.

  In this article we ask: what kind of information and how much of it should firms voluntarily disclose? Three types of disclosures are considered. One is information that complements the information available only to informed investors (to-be-processed complementary information). The second is information that is orthogonal to that which any investor can acquire and thus complements the information available to all investors (preprocessed complementary information). And the third is information that substitutes for the information of the informed investors in that it reveals to all what was previously known only by the informed (substitute information). Our main results are as follows. First, in equilibrium, all types of firms voluntarily disclose all three types of information. Second, in contrast to the existing literature, complementary information disclosure by firms strengthens investors' private incentives to acquire information. Substitute information disclosure weakens private information acquisition incentives. Third, while complementary information disclosure has an ambiguous effect on financial innovation incentives, substitute information disclosure weakens those incentives.

• Brennan, M. J., & Xia, Y. (2001). Assessing Asset Pricing Anomalies. Review of Financial Studies, 14, 905–942.

  The optimal portfolio strategy is developed for an investor who has detected an asset pricing anomaly but is not certain that the anomaly is genuine rather than merely apparent. The analysis takes account of the fact that the parameters of both the underlying asset pricing model and the anomalous returns are estimated rather than known. The value that an investor would place on the ability to invest to exploit the apparent anomaly is also derived and illustrative calculations are presented for the Fama and French SMB and HML portfolios, whose returns are anomalous relative to the CAPM.

• Buraschi, A., & Jackwerth, J. (2001). The Price of a Smile: Hedging and Spanning in Option Markets. Review of Financial Studies, 14, 495–527.

  The volatility smile changed drastically around the crash of 1987, and new option pricing models have been proposed to accommodate that change. Deterministic volatility models allow for more flexible volatility surfaces but refrain from introducing additional risk factors. Thus, options are still redundant securities. Alternatively, stochastic models introduce additional risk factors, and options are then needed for spanning of the pricing kernel. We develop a statistical test based on this difference in spanning. Using daily S&P 500 index options data from 1986-95, our tests suggest that both in- and out-of-the-money options are needed for spanning. The findings are inconsistent with deterministic volatility models but are consistent with stochastic models that incorporate additional priced risk factors, such as stochastic volatility, interest rates, or jumps.

• Dammon, R. M., Spatt, C. S., & Zhang, H. H. (2001). Optimal Consumption and Investment with Capital Gains Taxes. Review of Financial Studies, 14, 583–616.

  This article characterizes optimal dynamic consumption and portfolio decisions in the presence of capital gains taxes and short-sale restrictions. The optimal decisions are a function of the investor's age, initial portfolio holdings, and tax basis. Our results capture the trade-off between the diversification benefits and tax costs of trading over an investor's lifetime. The incentive to rediversify the portfolio is inversely related to the size of the embedded gain and investor's age. Contrary to standard financial advice, the optimal equity holding increases well into an investor's lifetime in our model due to the forgiveness of capital gains taxes at death.

• Dumas, B., & Uppal, R. (2001). Global Diversification, Growth, and Welfare with Imperfectly Integrated Markets for Goods. Review of Financial Studies, 14, 277–305.

  In this article we examine the effect of the imperfect mobility of goods on international risk sharing and, through that, on the investment in risky projects, welfare, and growth. Our main result is that the welfare gain from integration of financial markets is not greatly reduced by the presence of goods market imperfections, modeled as a cost of transferring goods from one country to the other. We also find that the gain is nonmonotonic with respect to investors' risk aversion and the aggregate volatility of output growth. The policy implication to be drawn is that financial market integration is a worthwhile goal to pursue even when full goods mobility has not been achieved.

• Franks, J., & Mayer, C. (2001). Ownership and Control of German Corporations. Review of Financial Studies, 14, 943–977.

  In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining, and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relationship of ownership to control in Germany is therefore similar to the United Kingdom and the United States. However, there are marked differences in dynamic relations involving transfers of ownership. There is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control, but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits to control changes and the exploitation of private benefits of control.