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Topic

Director Appointments: It Is Who You Know

Resource type
Authors/contributors
Title
Director Appointments: It Is Who You Know
Abstract
Using 9,801 director appointments during 2003–2014, we document the dramatic impact of connections. Sixty-nine percent of new directors have professional ties to incumbent boards, a group representing 13 of all potential candidates. Consistent with facilitating coordination and reducing search costs, connections help boards bring in gender diversity, new skills, and new industry background. More complex firms and firms in more competitive environments tend to appoint connected directors and experience better market reactions and higher shareholder votes. Connections to incumbent CEOs, however, result in lower announcement returns and shareholder votes. We use death (merger)-induced network loss (gain) as instruments.
Publication
Review of Financial Studies
Volume
35
Issue
4
Pages
1933-1982
Date
2022
Citation
Le, J. C., Nguyen, T., & Walkling, R. (2022). Director Appointments: It Is Who You Know. Review of Financial Studies, 35, 1933–1982.
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