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Topic

Dynastic Control Without Ownership Evidence from Post War Japan

Resource type
Authors/contributors
Title
Dynastic Control Without Ownership Evidence from Post War Japan
Abstract
Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding-family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than 5%). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki, and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes family ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of family legacy and talent.
Publication
Journal of Financial Economics
Volume
142
Issue
S0304405X21002889
Pages
831-843
Date
2021
Citation
Bennedsen, M., Mehrotra, V., Shim, J., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2021). Dynastic Control Without Ownership Evidence from Post War Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 142, 831–843.
Topic
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