A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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Results 19 resources
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We extend the neoclassical investment model (Hayashi, 1982) to allow for limited commitment on compensation contracts. We consider three types of limited commitment: (i) managers cannot commit to compensation contracts that provide lower continuation utility than their outside options; (ii) shareholders cannot commit to negative net present value (NPV) projects; (iii) both the managers and the shareholders cannot commit. We characterize the optimal contract under general convex adjustment cost functions and provide examples for which closed-form solutions can be obtained. We show that, as in the data, small firms invest more, grow faster, and have a higher Tobin׳s Q than large firms under the optimal contract. In addition, the pattern of the dependence of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation on past performance implied by our model is also consistent with empirical evidence.
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The literature posits that some CEO overconfidence benefits shareholders, though high levels may not. We argue that adequate controls and independent viewpoints provided by an independent board mitigates the costs of CEO overconfidence. We use the concurrent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and changes to the NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules (collectively, SOX) as natural experiments, to examine whether board independence improves decision making by overconfident CEOs. The results are strongly supportive: after SOX, overconfident CEOs reduce investment and risk exposure, increase dividends, improve postacquisition performance, and have better operating performance and market value. Importantly, these changes are absent for overconfident-CEO firms that were compliant prior to SOX.
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There is mounting evidence of the influence of personal characteristics of chief executive officers (CEOs) on corporate outcomes. In this paper we analyze the relation between military service of CEOs and managerial decisions, financial policies, and corporate outcomes. Exploiting exogenous variation in the propensity to serve in the military, we show that military service is associated with conservative corporate policies and ethical behavior. Military CEOs pursue lower corporate investment, are less likely to be involved in corporate fraudulent activity, and perform better during industry downturns. Taken together, our results show that military service has significant explanatory power for managerial decisions and firm outcomes.
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We show that firms with Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) who personally benefit from options backdating are more likely to engage in other corporate misbehaviors, suggestive of an unethical corporate culture. These firms are more likely to commit financial fraud to overstate earnings. They acquire more private companies, which could perpetuate their frauds, and their acquisitions are met with lower market responses. These misbehaviors are concentrated in firms with externally hired suspect CEOs, consistent with outside CEOs having greater discretion to shape firm culture. The costs of these misbehaviors are reflected in larger stock price declines during a market correction and increased CEO replacement.
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Building on two sources of exogenous shocks to analyst coverage (broker closures and mergers), we explore the causal effects of analyst coverage on mitigating managerial expropriation of outside shareholders. We find that as a firm experiences an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage, shareholders value internal cash holdings less, its CEO receives higher excess compensation, its management is more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions, and its managers are more likely to engage in earnings management activities. Importantly, we find that most of these effects are mainly driven by the firms with smaller initial analyst coverage and less product market competition. We further find that after exogenous brokerage exits, a CEO׳s total and excess compensation become less sensitive to firm performance in firms with low initial analyst coverage. These findings are consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, specifically that financial analysts play an important governance role in scrutinizing management behavior, and the market is pricing an increase in expected agency problems after the loss in analyst coverage.
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We examine how executives' behavior outside the workplace, as measured by their ownership of luxury goods (low “frugality”) and prior legal infractions, is related to financial reporting risk. We predict and find that chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) with a legal record are more likely to perpetrate fraud. In contrast, we do not find a relation between executives' frugality and the propensity to perpetrate fraud. However, as predicted, we find that unfrugal CEOs oversee a relatively loose control environment characterized by relatively high and increasing probabilities of other insiders perpetrating fraud and unintentional material reporting errors during their tenure. Further, cultural changes associated with an increase in fraud risk are more likely during unfrugal (vs. frugal) CEOs' reigns, including the appointment of an unfrugal CFO, an increase in executives' equity-based incentives to misreport, and a decline in measures of board monitoring intensity.
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Following corporate spinoffs, unit boards are formed from scratch. We find that these "de novo" boards are smaller, more independent, include more outside directors with relevant industry expertise, and derive more industry expertise from outsiders than do industry- and size-matched peers. These differences are observed only when the unit CEO was not the CEO or a director of the pre-spinoff parent firm—that is, when there is a greater need to assess the CEO's ability and match with the firm. We conclude that the need for CEO assessment is an important element of the structure of newly formed boards.
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We study the effects on M&A outcomes of CEO network centrality, which measures the extent and strength of a CEO׳s personal connections. High network centrality can allow CEOs to efficiently gather and control private information, facilitating value-creating acquisition decisions. We show, however, that M&A deals initiated by high-centrality CEOs, in addition to being more frequent, carry greater value losses to both the acquirer and the combined entity than deals initiated by low-centrality CEOs. We also document that high-centrality CEOs are capable of avoiding the discipline of the markets for corporate control and the executive labor market, and that the mitigating effect of internal governance on CEO actions is limited. Our evidence suggests that corporate decisions can be influenced by a CEO׳s position in the social hierarchy, with high-centrality CEOs using their power and influence to increase entrenchment and reap private benefits.
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Firm fixed effects alone explain as much of the variation in acquirer returns as all the firm- and deal-specific characteristics combined. An interquartile range of acquirer fixed effects is over 6%, comparable to the interquartile range of acquirer returns. Acquirer returns persist over time, but mainly at the top end of the distribution. Persistence continues under different chief executive officers (CEOs), and attributes of the broader management team do not explain the fixed effect. Firm-specific heterogeneity in acquirer returns suggests that some organizations are extraordinary acquirers irrespective of the leadership at the top and the deal structures they choose. Implications for the M&A research are discussed.
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We use a unique data set that contains information on more than 1,000 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) around the world to investigate the degree to which executives delegate financial decisions and the circumstances that drive variation in delegation. Delegation does not appear to be monolithic; instead, our results show that it varies across corporate policies and also varies with the personal characteristics of the CEO. We find that CEOs delegate financial decisions for which they need the most input, when they are overloaded, and when they are distracted by recent acquisitions. CEOs delegate less when they are knowledgeable (long-tenured or with a finance background). Capital is allocated based on “gut feel” and the personal reputation of the manager running a given division. Finally, corporate politics and corporate socialism affect capital allocation in European and Asian firms.
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- CEO
- Mergers and Acquisitions (4)
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- Journal Article (19)