A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

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Results 23 resources

  • We examine the role of cultural heritage in shaping U.S. CEOs’ attitudes toward uncertainty, in the context of their corporate acquisition decisions. We find that CEOs with a more uncertainty-avoiding cultural heritage are less likely to engage in acquisitions. Conditional on making an acquisition, uncertainty-averse CEOs prefer targets in familiar industries and targets that can be more easily integrated. The emphasis on cultural identity by CEOs’ parents and the ethnic composition of CEOs’ early life environment significantly influence the cultural transmission process. Cultural differences about uncertainty attitudes persist over multiple generations, but become less pronounced over time. (JEL G34, G4, G40, G41)

  • We study the effects on M&A outcomes of CEO network centrality, which measures the extent and strength of a CEO׳s personal connections. High network centrality can allow CEOs to efficiently gather and control private information, facilitating value-creating acquisition decisions. We show, however, that M&A deals initiated by high-centrality CEOs, in addition to being more frequent, carry greater value losses to both the acquirer and the combined entity than deals initiated by low-centrality CEOs. We also document that high-centrality CEOs are capable of avoiding the discipline of the markets for corporate control and the executive labor market, and that the mitigating effect of internal governance on CEO actions is limited. Our evidence suggests that corporate decisions can be influenced by a CEO׳s position in the social hierarchy, with high-centrality CEOs using their power and influence to increase entrenchment and reap private benefits.

  • Firm fixed effects alone explain as much of the variation in acquirer returns as all the firm- and deal-specific characteristics combined. An interquartile range of acquirer fixed effects is over 6%, comparable to the interquartile range of acquirer returns. Acquirer returns persist over time, but mainly at the top end of the distribution. Persistence continues under different chief executive officers (CEOs), and attributes of the broader management team do not explain the fixed effect. Firm-specific heterogeneity in acquirer returns suggests that some organizations are extraordinary acquirers irrespective of the leadership at the top and the deal structures they choose. Implications for the M&A research are discussed.

  • This paper explores the impact of target CEOs’ retirement preferences on takeovers. Using retirement age as a proxy for CEOs’ private merger costs, we find strong evidence that target CEOs’ preferences affect merger activity. The likelihood of receiving a successful takeover bid is sharply higher when target CEOs are close to age 65. Takeover premiums and target announcement returns are similar for retirement‐age and younger CEOs, implying that retirement‐age CEOs increase firm sales without sacrificing premiums. Better corporate governance is associated with more acquisitions of firms led by young CEOs, and with a smaller increase in deals at retirement age.

  • Finance theory predicts that board independence is not always in the shareholders׳ interest. in situations in which board advice is more important than monitoring, independence can decrease firm value. I test this prediction by examining the connection between takeover returns and board friendliness, using social ties between the CEO and board members as a proxy for less independent boards. I find that social ties are associated with higher bidder announcement returns when the potential value of board advice is high, but with lower returns when monitoring needs are high. The evidence suggests that friendly boards can have both costs and benefits, depending on the company׳s specific needs.

  • This article investigates the effect of social ties between acquirers and targets on merger performance. We find that the extent of cross-firm social connection between directors and senior executives at the acquiring and the target firms has a significantly negative effect on the abnormal returns to the acquirer and to the combined entity upon merger announcement. Moreover, acquirer-target social ties significantly increase the likelihood that the target firm׳s chief executive officer (CEO) and a larger fraction of the target firm׳s pre-acquisition board of directors remain on the board of the combined firm after the merger. In addition, we find that acquirer CEOs are more likely to receive bonuses and are more richly compensated for completing mergers with targets that are highly connected to the acquiring firms, that acquisitions are more likely to take place between two firms that are well connected to each other through social ties, and that such acquisitions are more likely to subsequently be divested for performance-related reasons. Taken together, our results suggest that social ties between the acquirer and the target lead to poorer decision making and lower value creation for shareholders overall.

  • To examine the market response to positive revelations of chief executive officer (CEO) quality, this study focuses on CEOs who withdraw acquisition bids when the price becomes increasingly expensive. Firms that withdrawal for price-related reasons earn higher withdrawal returns than firms that withdraw for other reasons. This relation is stronger when CEO uncertainty and discretion is high. CEOs unwilling to increase the offer price are less likely to be replaced and more likely to advance to a larger firm than a control group of CEOs. The finding that the market attaches value to CEO-specific information suggests that unobservable manager characteristics can meaningfully impact firm outcomes.

  • Knowledge gleaned from previous acquisitions may confer valuation expertise and other benefits. But numerous acquisitions also entail costs, due to problems of incorporating diverse units into an ever larger firm. Such benefits and costs are not directly observable from outside the firm. This article proposes a simple model to infer their relative importance, using the time between successive deals. The data requirements are minimal and allow the use of all mergers and acquisitions during 1992–2009 (more than 300,000 deals). The results provide evidence of learning gains through repetitive acquisitions, especially under CEO continuity and when successive deals are more similar.

  • This paper shows how chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics affect the performance of acquirers in diversifying takeovers. When the acquirer's CEO has previous experience in the target industry, the acquirer's abnormal announcement returns are between 1.2 and 2.0 percentage points larger than those generated by a CEO who is new to the target industry. This outcome is driven by the industry-expert CEO's ability to capture a larger fraction of the merger surplus. Industry-expert CEOs typically negotiate better deals and pay a lower premium for the target. This effect is stronger when information asymmetry is high and in bilateral negotiations compared to auctions. We also find that industry-expert CEOs on average select lower surplus deals. This evidence is consistent with industry-expert CEOs having superior negotiation skills.

  • We show that acquisitions initiated during periods of high merger activity (“merger waves”) are accompanied by poorer quality of analysts' forecasts, greater uncertainty, and weaker CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. These conditions imply reduced monitoring and lower penalties for initiating inefficient mergers. Therefore, merger waves may foster agency-driven behavior, which, along with managerial herding, could lead to worse mergers. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the average long-term performance of acquisitions initiated during merger waves is significantly worse. We also find that corporate governance of in-wave acquirers is weaker, suggesting that agency problems may be present in merger wave acquisitions.

Last update from database: 5/15/24, 11:01 PM (AEST)