A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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Results 243 resources
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Revaluations of industry peers around horizontal acquisitions are negative when targets are private, but positive when they are public. We posit this “revaluation spread” arises because acquiring managers favor private targets when public firms are overvalued. Targets’ ownership status thus conveys information about industry assets’ misvaluation and triggers predictable revaluations. Supporting this idea, private acquisitions occur when private targets appear “cheaper” than public firms based on valuation multiples or the trading activity of industry insiders. The revaluation spread varies with overall market misvaluation, predicts future industry returns, and is unrelated to peers’ and industries’ fundamentals.
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We open the black box of the M&A decision process by examining whether specialized M&A staff, who perform a wide range of acquisition-related functions, improve acquisition performance. We find that the presence and the quality of specialized M&A staff is one of the most economically important determinants of acquisition performance. We explore mechanisms through which specialized M&A staff improve acquisition performance and investigate why only less than half of US firms employ such staff. Agency costs are a first-order determinant for specialized M&A staff's value-creation role. Such staff do not improve acquisition performance in firms with heightened agency conflicts.
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Using unique data, this paper examines investment banks’ choice of peers in comparable companies analysis in mergers and acquisitions. We find strong evidence that product market space is amongst the most important factors in peer selection, but Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, particularly three and four digit codes, do a poor job of categorizing related firms in this setting. Banks strategically select large, high growth peers with high valuation multiples, factors that are also positively related to premiums. Our evidence is consistent with target-firm advisors selecting peers with high valuation multiples to negotiate higher takeover prices.
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Announcements of stock-financed mergers and acquisitions (M&As) may attract short selling of bidder shares by merger arbitrageurs. We hypothesize that bidders with higher short-selling potential include a higher proportion of cash in their M&A payments to mitigate stock price declines resulting from arbitrage short sales. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the ex ante net lending supply of bidder shares has a positive impact on the percentage of cash in public target payments. Further tests, including a placebo analysis of public-to-private deals and an analysis of expected price pressure proxies, corroborate the impact of anticipated arbitrage-related price pressure on payment choice.
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Theory predicts that horizontal acquisitions can effectively increase incumbent firms’ market power in concentrated industries with high product similarity. Using a novel measure for industry product similarity, we show that in such industries firms’ propensity to make horizontal acquisitions is greater and that the acquisitions result in more positive announcement returns for the acquirer and rival firms and in a larger premium paid for the target. Also, the deals harm dependent customer and supplier firms and they are more likely to be challenged by antitrust authorities. Overall, by emphasizing the importance of product similarity, our results help explain mixed empirical findings on whether horizontal acquisitions are used to reduce competition intensity.
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We examine the impact of creditor control rights on corporate acquisitions. Nearly 75 of loan agreements include restrictions that limit borrower acquisition decisions throughout the life of the contract. Following a financial covenant violation, creditors use their bargaining power to tighten these restrictions and limit acquisition activity, particularly deals expected to earn negative announcement returns. Firms that do announce an acquisition after violating a financial covenant earn 1.8 higher stock returns, on average, and do not pursue less risky deals. We conclude that creditors use contractual rights and the renegotiation process to limit value-destroying acquisitions driven by managerial agency problems.
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Cross-border merger activity is growing in importance. We map the global trade network each year from 1989 to 2016 and compare it to cross-border and domestic merger activity. Trade-weighted merger activity in trading partner countries has statistically and economically significant explanatory power for the likelihood that a given country will be in a merger wave state, at both the cross-border and domestic levels, even controlling for its own lagged merger activity. The role of trade as a channel for transmitting merger waves is confirmed using import tariff cuts and trade sanctions as instruments to mitigate endogeneity. Overall, the full trade network helps our understanding of merger waves and how merger activity propagate across borders.
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We examine whether bilateral investment treaties (BITs), an external governance mechanism, stimulate cross-border mergers by protecting the property rights of foreign acquirers. Exploiting the staggered adoption and bilateral nature of the treaties, we find that BITs have a large positive effect on cross-border mergers. The probability and dollar volume of mergers between two given countries more than doubles after the signing of a BIT. The increase is driven by deals flowing from developed economies to developing economies and is concentrated in target countries with medium levels of political risk. The results suggest BITs are effective in expanding the global market for corporate control, particularly in the developing world.
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We examine how search frictions affect merger outcomes. Exploiting firm connections in common bank networks (CBNs) as a channel for reducing search costs, we show that like-buys-like mergers are more probable between firms connected through a CBN. This effect is amplified if the connection has been recently formed or the network contains many plausible choices for merger partners. CBN-facilitated mergers exhibit higher synergy and lower post-merger cost of debt. We confirm that CBNs reduce search costs even after alternative explanations are considered. These findings highlight the importance of search in the process of redrawing firm boundaries.
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We find that the acquirer's (1) abnormal returns at merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements and (2) long-term abnormal returns after acquisitions increase with target firm insiders’ net purchase ratios. Further, acquisition synergies, measured as the (1) acquirer-target combined cumulative abnormal returns at M&A announcements and (2) changes in three-year operating performance after acquisitions, increase with target insider net purchase ratios. Notwithstanding, targets with higher insider net purchase ratios receive higher takeover premiums. Overall, our findings suggest that, even under the SEC's “short-swing rule,” target insider trading prior to the M&A announcement serves as a credible signal for acquisition outcomes.
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Journals
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- Mergers and Acquisitions
- CEO (23)
- Director (5)
- Capital Structure (2)
- Bond (2)
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Between 1900 and 1999
(88)
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