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The Investment Banking Contract for New Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem.

Resource type
Authors/contributors
Title
The Investment Banking Contract for New Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem.
Publication
The Journal of Finance
Volume
35
Issue
5
Pages
1115-38
Date
1980-12
Citation
Baron, D. P., & Holmstrom, B. (1980). The Investment Banking Contract for New Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem. The Journal of Finance, 35, 1115–1138.
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