A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 186 resources
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This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of North-South trade in which research and development races between firms determine the rate of product innovation in the North. Tariffs designed to protect dying industries in the North from Southern competition reduce the steady-state number of dominant firms in the North, reduce the rate of product innovation, and increase the relative wage of Northern workers. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.
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It is often argued that efficiency considerations require society to freely permit insider trading. In this article, an opposing efficiency argument is formalized. The model incorporates an investment stage followed by a trading stage. If "outsiders" expect "insiders" to take advantage of them in trading, outsiders will reduce their investment. The insiders' loss from this diminished investor confidence may more than offset their trading gains. Consequently, a prohibition on insider trading may effect a Pareto improvement. Insiders are made better off if they can precommit not to trade on their privileged information; government regulation accomplished exactly this. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.
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This paper presents a stochastic analysis of the demand for interest-bearing money, such as NOW accounts, when overdrafting is allowed at some penalty rate. It is shown that the short-run interest elasticity of money demand is probably large (in absolute value) and negative, but in the long run this elasticity is much smaller or even positive. It is also argued that current definitions of the monetary aggregates, which exclude unused credit, may spuriously generate instability of money demand. An alternative definition of money stock is suggested and seems to be conceptually more satisfying. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.
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This paper analyzes the optimal structure of government debt in a stochastic environment. In a model with distortionary taxes, the government should smooth tax rates over states of nature as well as over time. Government liabilities should be structured to hedge against macroeconomic shocks that affect the government budget. The optimal structure of government liabilities generally includes some "risky" securities that are state-contingent in real terms. The empirical part of the paper tests for tax smoothing and then studies state contingencies implemented by some specific securities, including nominal debt, long-term bonds, equity, and foreign-currency debt. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.
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Best-price provisions guarantee buyers that the prices they pay are the lowest available. If the seller subsequently cuts price, then each previous buyer is entitled to a refund. A durable-good monopolist who offers certain forms of these provisions can construct a consistent plan yielding the same profits as rental agreements and contracts with explicit quantity commitments. The provisions require special circumstances to be practical, but they are simple and effective and appear in a variety of economic settings. Three applications are discussed: international commodity agreements, markets for electric turbogenerators, and markets for financial claims. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.
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One question development economists are especially interested in, but so far left unanswered, is how the societal income distribution would be affected by introducing a family-planning program to reduce the reproduction rate of the poor, which is usually high in developing countries. The purpose of this paper is to search for analytical answers to this question. The authors are able to make definite comparisons about some class of inequality measures of the steady-state societal income distributions, and these comparisons provide strong theoretical support in favor for the above-mentioned family-planning program. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.
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Hierarchical organizations often perform poorly in inducing the adoption of innovations. The authors examine a principal offering contracts to agents who make unobservable effort and adoption-of-innovation choices (yielding moral hazard); who occupy jobs of differing, unobserved productivities (yielding adverse selection); and who engage in a repeated relationship with the principal (causing a ratchet effect to arise). Increasing the rate of adoption of an innovation in such an organization causes the incentive costs of adoption to increase at an increasing rate. Relatively low rates of adoption may then be a response to the prohibitive incentive costs of higher adoption rates. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.