A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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Results 13 resources
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This paper focuses on the valuation of caps, floors, and collars in a contingent claim framework under continuous time. These instruments are interpreted as options on traded zero coupon bonds. The bond prices themselves are used as the underlying stochastic variables. This has the advantage that the authors end up with closed-form solutions that are easy to compute. Special attention is devoted to the choice of the stochastic process appropriate for the price dynamics of the underlying zero coupon bonds.
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Share price reactions to announcements of sixty-one private placements of convertible debt securities are investigated and a significant positive average abnormal return of 1.80 percent is documented. This unique result contrasts with the negative average abnormal return associated with public sales of convertible debt securities. The positive effect on common shareholders' wealth appears to be related to the relative size of the private issue and unrelated to the degree to which the convertible bond is "out-of-the-money" at issuance.
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This comment describes the U.S. federal income tax treatment of corporate bonds that are indexed for inflation and argues that these bonds do not have a tax-induced clientele in the United States.
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The effects of asset liquidity on expected returns for assets with infinite maturities (stocks) are examined for bonds (Treasury notes and bills with matched maturities of less than six months). The yield to maturity is higher on notes, which have lower liquidity. The yield differential between notes and bills is a decreasing and convex function of the time to maturity. The results provide a robust confirmation of the liquidity effect in asset pricing.
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This paper examines why, in contrast to the predictions of finance theory, firms do not call convertible debt when the conversion price exceeds the call price. The empirical results suggest that the principal reason is because some firms enjoy an advantage of paying less in after-tax interest than they would pay in dividends were the bond converted. This cash flow incentive is the inverse of an investor's incentive to convert voluntarily if the converted dividends are greater than the bond's coupon. Because of taxation, however, the decisions by investors and firms are not symmetric, and there exist bonds which the firm may not call and an investor will not convert. The results also find that voluntary conversion is significantly related to both the conversion price and the differential between the coupon and the dividends on the converted stock.
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The information content of conversion-forcing bond calls depends on the after-tax cash flow to bondholders. If the dividend after conversion exceeds the after-tax coupon but is less than the before-tax coupon, the call reveals unanticipated decreases in dividends and/or earnings that reduce the tax shield from interest payments. In contrast, a call when the dividend is less than the after-tax coupon reveals the timing of an anticipated shift from exceptional firm-specific positive growth to the industry norm. Efforts to document properties of convertible calls are subject to sample-selection bias because calls are disproportionately associated with positive pre-call firm-specific growth.
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Ten percent of the investment-grade industrial bonds that were associated with major capital restructurings between 1983 and 1988 had already been downgraded to speculative grade as of August 1989. In response to these downgrades and the corresponding wealth losses for bondholders, over 40 percent of recently issued investment-grade industrial bonds are protected from this type of "event risk" by virtue of specialized covenants. These event-risk covenants may have initially reduced interest costs for borrowers by roughly 20 to 30 basis points. However, the magnitude of the effect appears to have declined along with the general decline in corporate restructurings.
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This paper examines the risks and returns of long-term low-grade bonds for the period 1977-89. The authors find (1) low-grade bonds realized higher returns than higher-grade bonds and lower returns than common stocks, and low-grade bonds exhibited less volatility than higher-grade bonds due to their call features and high coupons; (2) there is no relation between the age of low-grade bonds and their relaxed returns; cyclical factors explain much of the observed reaction between default rates and bond age; and (3) low-grade bonds behave like both bonds and stocks. Despite this complexity there is no evidence that low-grade bonds are systematically over- or under-priced.
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This study extends the literature on the pricing of low-grade bonds by examining the performance of low-grade bond funds. The findings reveal that over the long run low-grade bond fund returns are approximately equal to the returns provided by an index of high-grade bonds. The relative risks of high and low-grade bonds are more difficult to assess. Because of their shorter durations, low-grade bonds are less sensitive to movements in interest rates than high-grade bonds. On the other hand, low-grade bonds are much more sensitive to changes in stock prices than high-grade bonds. When adjusted for risk using a simple two-factor model, the returns on low-grade bond funds are not statistically different from the returns on high-grade bonds.
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This paper extends the arbitrage pricing theory to an international setting. Specifying a linear factor return-generating model in local currency terms, the author shows that the usual risk-diversification rule in the arbitrage pricing theory does not yield a riskless portfolio unless currency fluctuations obey the same factor model as asset returns. The author then considers an arbitrage portfolio whose exchange risk is hedged by foreign riskless bonds. Under the resulting no-arbitrage conditions, the expected returns are not on the same hyperplane, unlike the closed-economy arbitrage pricing theory, unless they are adjusted by the cost of exchange risk hedging.