A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

• Glen, J., & Jorion, P. (1993). Currency Hedging for International Portfolios. The Journal of Finance, 48, 1865–1886.

  This paper examines the benefits from currency hedging, both for speculative and risk minimization motives, in international bond and equity portfolios. The risk-return performances of globally diversified portfolios are compared with and without forward contracts. Over the period 1974 to 1990, inclusion of forward contracts results in statistically significant improvements in the performance of unconditional portfolios containing bonds. Conditional strategies are also implemented, both in sample and out of sample, and are shown to both significantly improve the risk-return tradeoff of global portfolios and to outperform unconditional hedging strategies.

• Glosten, L. R., Jagannathan, R., & Runkle, D. E. (1993). On the Relation Between the Expected Value and the Volatility of the Nominal Excess Return on Stocks. The Journal of Finance, 48, 1779–1801.

  The authors find support for a negative relation between conditional expected monthly return and conditional variance of monthly return using a GARCH-M model modified by allowing (1) seasonal patterns in volatility, (2) positive and negative innovations to returns having different impacts on conditional volatility, and (3) nominal interest rates to predict conditional variance. Using the modified GARCH-M model, they also show that monthly conditional volatility may not be as persistent as was thought. Positive unanticipated returns appear to result in a downward revision of the conditional volatility, whereas negative unanticipated returns result in an upward revision of conditional volatility.

• Goetzmann, W. N. (1993). Accounting for Taste: Art and the Financial Markets over Three Centuries. American Economic Review, 83, 1370–1376.
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• Hasabrouck, J., & Sofianos, G. (1993). The Trades of Market Makers: An Empirical Analysis of NYSE Specialists. The Journal of Finance, 48, 1565–1593.

  This paper presents a transaction-level empirical analysis of the trading activities of New York Stock Exchange specialists. The main findings of the analysis are the following: adjustment lags in inventories vary across stocks and are in some cases as long as one or two months; decomposition of specialist trading profits by trading horizon shows that the principal source of these profits is short term; an analysis of the dynamic relations among inventories, signed order flow, and quote changes suggests that trades in which the specialist participates have a higher immediate impact on the quotes than trades with no specialist participation.

• Jappelli, T., & Pagano, M. (1993). Information Sharing in Credit Markets. The Journal of Finance, 48, 1693–1718.

  The authors present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously. Lenders' incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers, to the size of the credit market, and to advances in information technology; such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants. In addition, information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market. These predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market.

• Kahn, L. M., & Munighan, J. K. (1993). A General Experiment on Bargaining in Demand Games with Outside Options. American Economic Review, 83, 1260–1280.

  This experiment factorially combined the major independent variables from previous demand-game experiments (discount factors, outside options, termination probability, and first mover). Game-theoretic predictions were largely refuted by the data and outcomes were often inefficient. Players without an outside option demanded more than predicted and those with an option appeared to anticipate this behavior. Nonetheless, there was a positive relationship between differences in equilibrium predictions and differences in behavior. Bargainers appeared to focus on a minimally acceptable offer in making their demands and in considering the likelihood that the other party would accept their offer. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.

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• Laban, R., & Wolf, H. C. (1993). Large-Scale Privatization in Transition Economies. American Economic Review, 83, 1199–1210.

  To explain the slow progress of mass privatization programs in Eastern Europe, the authors present a model based on a positive spillover between aggregate privatization and the individual expected return to privatization, derived from a potential populist backlash if costly reforms do not bring forth sufficient aggregate privatization. The model allows for the simultaneous existence of a pessimistic zero-privatization trap and an optimistic full-privatization equilibrium defined by a critical mass of expected privatization. While both privatization subsidies and minimum-income guarantees can by themselves secure coordination on the optimistic equilibrium, the financing constraint may offset the direct effect. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.

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• Levine, D. I. (1993). Fairness, Markets, and Ability to Pay: Evidence from Compensation Executives. American Economic Review, 83, 1241–1259.

  This paper examines a unique data set based on surveys of 139 compensation executives. Respondents read scenarios describing a hypothetical company and its labor market, and recommended wage changes for several positions. Contrary to some popular theories, differences in unemployment, quit rates, and a company's return on assets led to almost no change in respondents' recommended wage increases. When market wages for closely related occupations diverged, most respondents did not recommend adjusting relative wages within the company; but when the occupations were not closely related (blue versus white collar), most respondents recommended adjusting relative wages to reflect market forces. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.

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• Madhavan, A., & Smidt, S. (1993). An Analysis of Changes in Specialist Inventories and Quotations. The Journal of Finance, 48, 1595–1628.

  The authors develop a dynamic model of market-making incorporating inventory and information effects. The marketmaker is both a dealer and an investor, quoting prices that induce mean reversion in inventory toward targets determined by portfolio considerations. The authors test the model with inventory data from a New York Stock Exchange specialist. Specialist inventories exhibit slow mean reversion, with a half-life of over forty-nine days, suggesting weak inventory effects. However, after controlling for shifts in desired inventories, the half-life falls to seven and three-tenths days. Further, quote revisions are negatively related to specialist trades and are positively related to the information conveyed by order imbalances.

• Maksimovic, V., & Unal, H. (1993). Issue Size Choice and “Underpricing” in Thrift Mutual-to-Stock Conversions. The Journal of Finance, 48, 1659–1692.

  Issue size choice and underpricing in mutual-to-stock conversions of thrifts are explained as a function of growth opportunities, perquisite consumption, and proprietary information. The authors provide evidence that thrifts with greater growth opportunities choose larger issue size and experience higher after-market price appreciation. This finding persists when they allow for investors' inferences about managers' proprietary information. Variables that explain underpricing in typical initial public offerings are significant by themselves but lose significance when combined with the issue size choice variables. Managerial holdings and the offer price do not act as dissipative signals of value in thrift conversions.