A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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Results 306 resources
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This article tests for the relations between trading volume and subsequent returns patterns in individual securities' short-horizon returns that are suggested by such articles as L. Blume, D. Easley, and M. O'Hara (1994) and J. Y. Campbell, S. J. Grossman, and J. Wang (1993). Using a variant of B. Lehmann's (1990) contrarian trading strategy, the authors find strong evidence of a relation between trading activity and subsequent autocovariances in weekly returns. Specifically, high-transaction securities experience price reversals, while the returns of low-transactions securities are positively autocovarying. Overall, information on trading activity appears to be an important predictor of the returns of individual securities.
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The author models standards for educational credentials, such as high-school diplomas. Standard-setters maximize their conception of social welfare, knowing that utility-maximizing students choose whether to meet the standard. The author shows that more egalitarian policymakers set lower standards, the median voter would prefer higher standards (under symmetric distributions), and decentralization lowers standards (among identical communities). Optimal standards do not necessarily fall with increased student preference for leisure, deterioration of nonstudent inputs to education, or increased student heterogeneity. Superseding binary credentials by perfect information increases average achievement and social welfare for plausible degrees of heterogeneity, egalitarianism, and pooling under decentralization. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.
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In this paper, the authors investigate the implications of flexible manufacturing for market structure. In the received theory of market structure, based largely on inflexible techniques of production, a number of well-known forces work to limit concentration. In the authors' model, none of these forces exists. Hence, they conclude that flexible manufacturing promotes concentration through preemption and mergers, or equivalently through cartels. Interestingly, the concentrated market structures associated with flexibility may or may not be welfare-dominated by a regime in which monopolization is not allowed. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.
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Prior work with competitive rational expectations equilibrium models indicates that there should be a positive relation between trading volume and differences in beliefs or information among traders. We show that this result is sensitive to whether and how transaction costs are modeled. In a specialist market with endogenous transaction costs we show that trading volume can be negatively related to the degree of informational asymmetry in the market. Our analysis highlights the dependence of volume on market structure, and our results suggest that the 'volume effects' of corporate or macroeconomic events reflect a decrease, rather than an increase, in heterogeneity of beliefs or asymmetry of information.
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Under fairly general conditions, this article derives the equilibrium price schedule determined by the bids and offers in an open limit order book. The analysis shows that the order book has a small-trade positive bid-ask spread, and limit orders profit from small trades; the electronic exchange provides as much liquidity as possible in extreme situations; the limit order book does not invite competition from third market dealers, while other trading institutions do; and, if an entering exchange earns nonnegative trading profits, the consolidated price schedule matches the limit order book price schedule.
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The authors develop a model in which special-interest groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy. The interest groups bid for protection with their campaign support. Politicians maximize their own welfare, which depends on total contributions collected and on the welfare of voters. The authors study the structure of protection that emerges in the political equilibrium and the contributions by different lobbies that support the policy outcome. They also discuss why the lobbies may in some cases prefer to have the government use trade policy to transfer income, rather than more efficient means. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.
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The authors explore the twin hypotheses (1) that high-performance incentives, worker ownership of assets, and worker freedom from direct controls are complementary instruments for motivating workers, and (2) that such instruments can be expected to covary positively in cross-sectional data. They also relate their conclusions to empirical evidence, particularly that on the organization, compensation, and management of sales forces. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.
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