A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
Your search
Publication year
A Coalition-Formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs.
Resource type
Authors/contributors
- Burbidge, John B. (Author)
- DePater, James A. (Author)
- Meyers, Gordon M. (Author)
- Sengupta, Abhijit (Author)
Title
A Coalition-Formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs.
Abstract
The authors develop a model in which states may choose to form coalitions to capture efficiency gains from policy coordination. Joining a coalition entails setting the policy variable to maximize the coalition's aggregate payoff at a Nash equilibrium against nonmembers and to commit to a transfer scheme to share the gains. With two states, the unique equilibrium structure is complete federation; with more than two states, incomplete federation can be the unique equilibrium. Interpreting this result in terms of custom unions, the trend to trading-bloc formation may be equilibrium behavior even with cooperation and transfers within customs unions. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
Publication
American Economic Review
Volume
87
Issue
5
Pages
940-56
Date
1997-12
Citation
Burbidge, J. B., DePater, J. A., Meyers, G. M., & Sengupta, A. (1997). A Coalition-Formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs. American Economic Review, 87, 940–956.
Journals
Link to this record