A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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Results 345 resources
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I present a model where firms decide what types of jobs to create and then search for suitable workers. When there are few skilled workers and the skilled-unskilled productivity gap is small, firms create a single type of job and recruit all workers. An increase in the proportion of skilled workers or skill-biased technical change can create a qualitative change in the composition of jobs, increasing the demand for skills, wage inequality, and unemployment. I provide some evidence that there has been a change in the composition of jobs in the United States during the past two decades.
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In this paper we study the quantitative impact of marginal tax rates on the distribution of income. Our methodology builds on computable general-equilibrium framework. We find that distortions from marginal tax rate changes of the sort implied by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have sizable effects on income inequality in a reasonably quantified life-cycle setting: In our model rate changes alone capture half the increase in the pretax Gini that actually occurred between 1984 and 1989.
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Theory restricts short-run job creation and destruction responses and cumulative employment and job reallocation responses to allocative and aggregate shocks. We formulate these restrictions and implement them for postwar data on U.S. manufacturing. Allocative shocks are the main driving force behind cyclical movements in job reallocation, but their contribution to employment fluctuations varies greatly across alternative identification assumptions. Also, the data compel one or both of the following inferences: aggregate shocks greatly alter the shape and not just the mean of the cross-sectional density of employment growth rates; allocative shocks cause short-run reductions in aggregate employment.
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Theories of organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the U.S. Congress, explaining why committee systems emerge there, but not explaining variance in organization across legislatures of different countries. To analyze the effects of different constitutional features on the internal organization of legislatures, we adopt a vote-buying model and consider the incentives to delegate decision rights in a game among legislative chambers. We show how presidential veto power and bicameral separation can encourage a legislative chamber to create internal veto players or supermajority rules, while a unicameral structure can encourage legislators to delegate power to a leader.
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- Bond (12)
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- Journal Article (345)