A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 392 resources
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We study the residential choice of siblings who are altruistic towards their parents. The firstborn child's location choice influences the behavior of the second-born child and can shift some of the burden of providing care for the parents from one child to the other. These strategic considerations lead to an equilibrium location pattern with firstborn children locating further away from their parents than second-born children. We also analyze the location choices empirically using German data. These data confirm our theoretical predictions. (JEL H41, J10)
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In many important high-technology markets, including software development, data processing, communications, aeronautics, and defense, suppliers learn through experience how to provide better service at lower cost. This paper examines how a buyer designs dynamic competition among rival suppliers to exploit learning economies while minimizing the costs of becoming locked in to one producer. Strategies for controlling dynamic competition include the handicapping of more efficient suppliers in procurement competitions, the protection and allocation of intellectual property, and the sharing of information among rival suppliers. (JEL C73, D44, L10)
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Can historical wealth distributions affect long-run output and inequality despite "rational" saving, convex technology and no externalities? We consider a model of equilibrium short-period financial contracts, where poor agents face credit constraints owing to moral hazard and limited liability. If agents have no bargaining power, poor agents have no incentive to save: poverty traps emerge and agents are polarized into two classes, with no interclass mobility. If instead agents have all the bargaining power, strong saving incentives are generated: the wealth of poor and rich agents alike drift upward indefinitely and "history" does not matter eventually. (D31, D91, I32, O17, Q15)
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The pattern of disagreement between bond raters suggests that banks and insurance firms are inherently more opaque than other types of firms. Moody's and S&P split more often over these financial intermediaries, and the splits are more lopsided, as theory here predicts. Uncertainty over the banks stems from certain assets, loans and trading assets in particular, the risks of which are hard to observe or easy to change. Banks' high leverage, which invites agency problems, compounds the uncertainty over their assets. These findings bear on both the existence and reform of bank regulation. (JEL G20, G21, G28)
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We document the return to investing in U.S. nonpublicly traded equity. Entrepreneurial investment is extremely concentrated, yet despite its poor diversification, we find that the returns to private equity are no higher than the returns to public equity. Given the large public equity premium, it is puzzling why households willingly invest substantial amounts in a single privately held firm with a seemingly far worse risk-return trade-off. We briefly discuss how large nonpecuniary benefits, a preference for skewness, or overestimates of the probability of survival could potentially explain investment in private equity despite these findings. (JEL G11, G12, M13)
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Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation: employees are "rational cheaters," who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal benefits exceed costs. We investigate the "rational cheater model" by observing how experimentally induced variation in monitoring of telephone call center employees influences opportunism. A significant fraction of employees behave as the "rational cheater model" predicts. A substantial proportion of employees, however, do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate. This heterogeneity is related to variation in employee assessments of their general treatment by the employer. (JEL D2, J2, L2, L8, M12)
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Journals
Topic
- Bond (9)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (6)
- CEO (3)
- Director (2)
- Capital Structure (1)
Resource type
- Journal Article (392)