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Publication year
Fundamentals, Panics, and Bank Distress During the Depression
Resource type
Authors/contributors
- Calomiris, Charles W. (Author)
- Mason, Joseph R. (Author)
Title
Fundamentals, Panics, and Bank Distress During the Depression
Abstract
We assemble bank-level and other data for Fed member banks to model determinants of bank failure. Fundamentals explain bank failure risk well. The first two Friedman-Schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure. The third Friedman-Schwartz crisis is more ambiguous, but increased residual failure risk is small in the aggregate. The final crisis (early 1933) saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk. Local contagion and illiquidity may have played a role in pre-1933 bank failures, even though those effects were not large in their aggregate impact.
Publication
American Economic Review
Volume
93
Issue
5
Pages
1615-1647
Date
2003-12
Citation
Calomiris, C. W., & Mason, J. R. (2003). Fundamentals, Panics, and Bank Distress During the Depression. American Economic Review, 93, 1615–1647.
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