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Crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closelymonitored. We study the role of information in crises by introducing a financialmarket in a coordination game with imperfect information. The asset price aggregatesdispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal. In contrast tothe case with exogenous information, our main result is that uniqueness may notobtain as a perturbation from perfect information: multiplicity is ensured with smallnoise. In addition, we show that: (a) multiplicity may emerge in the financial priceitself; (b) less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when theequilibrium is unique; and (c) similar results obtain for a model where individualsobserve one another?s actions, highlighting the importance of endogenous informationmore generally. (JEL D53, D82, D83)