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We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individualaltruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards orpunishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motivefor which good deeds are performed, and this ?overjustification effect? can inducea partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. Wealso identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and, moregenerally, those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which weshow depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputationalconcern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and howmonopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shownto potentially reduce social welfare. (JEL D11, D64, D82, Z13)