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Publication year
Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
Resource type
Authors/contributors
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila (Author)
- Pathak, Parag A. (Author)
- Roth, Alvin E. (Author)
Title
Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
Abstract
The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offsamong efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoreticalquestions. We analyze a model with indifferences – ties – in school preferences.Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferencesthe same way at every school – single tiebreaking – in a student-proposingdeferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realizedtiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally,we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated withstrategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.(JEL C78, D82, I21)
Publication
American Economic Review
Volume
99
Issue
5
Pages
1954-78
Date
2009-12
Citation
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2009). Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. American Economic Review, 99, 1954–1978.
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