A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

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Results 120 resources

  • We provide new evidence linking board characteristics and performance. Using manually collected governance data from the mutual fund industry, we find an inverse relation between board size and fund performance. We also find evidence that organizational form plays an important role in determining operational performance. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that there may not be a single optimal board structure that is applicable to all funds, that attempts to regulate board attributes should be considered with caution, and that sponsor-level factors are important board structure considerations.

  • We study the effects of physical distance on the acquisition and use of private information in informationally opaque credit markets. Using a unique data set of all loan applications by small firms to a large bank, we show that borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information, leading to a trade-off in the availability and pricing of credit, which is more readily accessible to nearby firms albeit at higher interest rates ceteris paribus. Analyzing loan rates and firms' decision to switch lenders provides further evidence for banks' strategic use of private information. However, distance erodes our lender's ability to collect proprietary intelligence and to carve out local captive markets, suggesting that the requisite soft information is primarily local.

  • This article examines the information content and consequences of third-party voting advice that arrives as news at an interim stage in corporate proxy contests. We first document significant stock returns around announcements of proxy vote recommendations. We then develop a multi-equation empirical procedure for disentangling the price impact of prediction effects (changes in contest outcome probabilities) from the price impact of certification effects (changes in outcome-contingent valuations). Both effects are present in the data: Voting advice is both predictive about contest outcomes and informative about the ability of dissidents to add value. Consequently, proxy advice plays a dual informational role. , Oxford University Press.

  • We use Monte Carlo simulations and real data to assess the performance of methods dealing with measurement error in investment equations. Our experiments show that fixed effects, error heteroscedasticity, and data skewness severely affect the performance and reliability of methods found in the literature. Estimators that use higher-order moments return biased coefficients for (both) mismeasured and perfectly measured regressors. These estimators are also very inefficient. Instrumental-variable-type estimators are more robust and efficient, although they require restrictive assumptions. We estimate empirical investment models using alternative methods. Real-world investment data contain firm-fixed effects and heteroscedasticity, causing high-order moments estimators to deliver coefficients that are unstable and not economically meaningful. Instrumental variables methods yield estimates that are robust and conform to theoretical priors. Our analysis provides guidance for dealing with measurement errors under circumstances researchers are likely to find in practice.

  • We examine how residents of the United States allocate their stock portfolios internationally. We find that a large U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) position in a destination country in 1990 is associated with a relatively large stock portfolio position in that country in the 2001–2006 period. Moreover, a change in the U.S. FDI position from 1980 to 1990 helps predict the change in the U.S. Foreign Portfolio Investment position from 1994 to 2006. These results are rationalized by Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp's (2009) equilibrium model of learning and portfolio choice under an information processing constraint. FDI establishes marginal differences in the endowments of information about different countries, which later translate into differences in stock portfolio holdings. We control for cross-country differences in capital controls, proximity along different dimensions, corporate governance, and economic and capital market development. Our results also hold for the G6 countries collectively.

  • The fast growth of Chinese private sector firms is taken as evidence that informal finance can facilitate firm growth better than formal banks in developing countries. We examine firm financing patterns and growth using a database of twenty-four hundred Chinese firms. While a relatively small percentage of firms utilize bank loans, bank financing is associated with faster growth whereas informal financing is not. Controlling for selection, we find that firms with bank financing grow faster than similar firms without bank financing and that our results are not driven by bank corruption or the selection of firms that have accessed the formal financial system. Our findings question whether reputation and relationship-based financing are responsible for the performance of the fastest-growing firms in developing countries.

  • We study the economic sources of stock-bond return comovements and their time variation using a dynamic factor model. We identify the economic factors employing a semi structural regime-switching model for state variables such as interest rates, inflation, the output gap, and cash flow growth. We also view risk aversion, uncertainty about inflation and output, and liquidity proxies as additional potential factors. We find that macroeconomic fundamentals contribute little to explaining stock and bond return correlations but that other factors, especially liquidity proxies, play a more important role. The macro factors are still important in fitting bond return volatility, whereas the "variance premium" is critical in explaining stock return volatility. However, the factor model primarily fails in fitting covariances.

  • We test whether stock market mispricing or private investor information in stock prices affects corporate investment. We develop an econometric methodology that disentangles stock-price movements that are relevant for investment from those that are not. We combine this decomposition with proxies for private information and mispricing to devise unbiased tests for the effects of mispricing and information on investment. We depart from much of the literature by finding that stock market mispricing does not affect investment, especially that of large firms and firms subject to mispricing. In contrast, we confirm previous evidence that managers incorporate private investor information when making investment decisions.

  • We solve the dynamic mean-variance portfolio problem and derive its time-consistent solution using dynamic programming. Previous literature, in contrast, only determines either myopic or precommitment (committing to follow the initially optimal policy) solutions. We provide a fully analytical simple characterization of the dynamically optimal mean-variance portfolios within a general incomplete-market economy. We also identify a probability measure that incorporates intertemporal hedging demands and facilitates tractability. We illustrate this by easily computing portfolios explicitly under various stochastic investment opportunities. A calibration exercise shows that the mean-variance hedging demands are economically significant.

  • We model how three groups–insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors, and entrepreneurs planning to take firms public–compete for influence over politicians setting the level of investor protection. We identify factors that push toward suboptimal investor protection, including corporate insiders' ability to use public firms' assets to influence politicians, and institutional investors' inability to capture fully the value of investor protection for outside investors. Entrepreneurs and public firms' interest in raising equity capital does not fully eliminate the distortions arising from insiders seeking to extract rents from capital in place. Our analysis produces many testable predictions concerning how investor protection varies over time and around the world.

Last update from database: 5/16/24, 11:00 PM (AEST)