A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

• Lochner, L. J., & Monge-Naranjo, A. (2011). The Nature of Credit Constraints and Human Capital. American Economic Review, 101, 2487–2529.

  We develop a human capital model with borrowing constraints explicitly derived from government student loan (GSL) programs and private lending under limited commitment. The model helps explain the persistent strong positive correlation between ability and schooling in the United States, as well as the rising importance of family income for college attendance. It also explains the increasing share of undergraduates borrowing the GSL maximum and the rise in student borrowing from private lenders. Our framework offers new insights regarding the interaction of government and private lending, as well as the responsiveness of private credit to economic and policy changes. (JEL D14, H52, I22, I23, J24)

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• Rudanko, L. (2011). Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk in a Frictional Labor Market. American Economic Review, 101, 2823–2843.

  This paper develops a tractable extension of a Mortensen-Pissarides style matching model that allows for risk averse workers with limited ability to smooth consumption. I show that this leads to a form of equilibrium wage rigidity, as the inability of workers to smooth their consumption across unemployment and employment spells changes how unemployed workers value wage offers, and hence also the offers that employers find profitable to make. In the model risk-averse entrepreneurs use optimal long-term contracts to attract risk averse workers facing limited access to asset markets. A simple analytic representation for the equilibrium is derived. (JEL D81, E21, E24, E32, J31, J41, J64)

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• Xiong, W., & Yu, J. (2011). The Chinese Warrants Bubble. American Economic Review, 101, 2723–2753.

  In 2005-2008, over a dozen put warrants traded in China went so deep out of the money that they were almost certain to expire worthless. Nonetheless, each warrant was traded more than three times each day at substantially inflated prices. This bubble is unique in that the underlying stock prices make warrant fundamentals publicly observable and that warrants have predetermined finite maturities. This sample allows us to examine a set of bubble theories. In particular, our analysis highlights the joint effects of short-sales constraints and heterogeneous beliefs in driving bubbles and confirms several key findings of the experimental bubble literature. (JEL G12, G13, O16, P34)

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• Alesina, A., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2011). Segregation and the Quality of Government in a Cross Section of Countries. American Economic Review, 101, 1872–1911.

  We provide a new compilation of data on ethnic, linguistic, and religious composition at the subnational level for a large number of countries. Using these data, we measure segregation of groups within the country. To overcome the endogeneity problem that arises because of mobility and endogenous internal borders, we construct an instrument for segregation. We find that more ethnically and linguistically segregated countries, i.e., those where groups live more spatially separately, have a lower quality of government; there is no relationship between religious segregation and governance. Trust is an important channel of influence; it is lower in more segregated countries. (JEL H11, H77, J15, O17, Z12, Z13)

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• Ashraf, Q., & Galor, O. (2011). Dynamics and Stagnation in the Malthusian Epoch. American Economic Review, 101, 2003–2041.

  This paper examines the central hypothesis of the influential Malthusian theory, according to which improvements in the technological environment during the preindustrial era had generated only temporary gains in income per capita, eventually leading to a larger, but not significantly richer, population. Exploiting exogenous sources of cross-country variations in land productivity and the level of technological advancement, the analysis demonstrates that, in accordance with the theory, technological superiority and higher land productivity had significant positive effects on population density but insignificant effects on the standard of living, during the time period 1-1500 CE. (JEL N10, N30, N50, O10, O40, O50)

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• Azzimonti, M. (2011). Barriers to Investment in Polarized Societies. American Economic Review, 101, 2182–2204.

  I present a tractable dynamic model of political economy where disagreements about the composition of public spending result in implementation of short-sighted policies. Excessive taxation reduces the return to physical capital and hence investment rates, which slows down growth along the transition. In the long run, output, consumption and welfare are inefficiently low. The larger is the degree of polarization, the greater is the inefficiency. Political stability mitigates the effects of polarization by making the incumbent internalize the dynamic inefficiencies introduced by the choice of growth-retarding policies. JEL: D72, E22, E23, E62, H25, O16, O17

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• Buera, F. J., Kaboski, J. P., & Shin, Y. (2011). Finance and Development: A Tale of Two Sectors. American Economic Review, 101, 1964–2002.

  We develop a quantitative framework to explain the relationship between aggregate/sector-level total factor productivity (TFP) and financial development across countries. Financial frictions distort the allocation of capital and entrepreneurial talent across production units, adversely affecting measured productivity. In our model, sectors with larger scales of operation (e.g., manufacturing) have more financing needs, and are hence disproportionately vulnerable to financial frictions. Our quantitative analysis shows that financial frictions account for a substantial part of the observed cross-country differences in output per worker, aggregate TFP, sector-level relative productivity, and capital-to-output ratios. (JEL E23, E44, O41, O47)

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• Campbell, J. Y., Giglio, S., & Pathak, P. (2011). Forced Sales and House Prices. American Economic Review, 101, 2108–2131.

  This paper uses data on all house transactions in Massachusetts over the last 20 years to show that houses sold after foreclosure, or close in time to the death or bankruptcy of a seller, are sold at lower prices than other houses. Foreclosure discounts are on average at 27 percent of the value of a house. Moreover, foreclosures that take place within small local geographies of a house lower the price at which it is sold. Our preferred estimate is that a foreclosure at a distance of 0.05 miles lowers the price of a house by about 1 percent.

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• Cebul, R. D., Rebitzer, J. B., Taylor, L. J., & Votruba, M. E. (2011). Unhealthy Insurance Markets: Search Frictions and the Cost and Quality of Health Insurance. American Economic Review, 101, 1842–1871.

  We analyze the effect of search frictions in the market for commercial health insurance. Frictions increase insurance premiums (enough to transfer 13.2 percent of consumer surplus from fully insured employer groups to insurers—approximately $34.4 billion in 1997); and increase insurance turnover (by 64 percent for the average policy). This rent transfer harms consumers and—when combined with heightened turnover—reduces incentives to invest in future health. We also find that a publicly financed insurance option can improve the efficiency of private insurance markets by reducing search friction induced distortions in pricing and marketing efforts. (JEL D83 G22, I18)

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• Crawford, V. P., & Meng, J. (2011). New York City Cab Drivers’ Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income. American Economic Review, 101, 1912–1932.

  This paper proposes a model of cab drivers' labor supply, building on Henry S. Farber's (2005, 2008) empirical analyses and Botond Koszegi and Matthew Rabin's (2006; henceforth "KR") theory of reference-dependent preferences. Following KR, our model has targets for hours as well as income, determined by proxied rational expectations. Our model, estimated with Farber's data, reconciles his finding that stopping probabilities are significantly related to hours but not income with Colin Camerer et al.'s (1997) negative "wage" elasticity of hours; and avoids Farber's criticism that estimates of drivers' income targets are too unstable to yield a useful model of labor supply. (JEL J22, J31, L92)

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