A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

• Richter, M., & Rubinstein, A. (2015). Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies. American Economic Review, 105, 2570–2594.

  We propose a new abstract definition of equilibrium in the spirit of competitive equilibrium: a profile of alternatives and a public ordering (expressing prestige, price, or a social norm) such that each agent prefers his assigned alternative to all lower-ranked ones. The equilibrium operates in an abstract setting built upon a concept of convexity borrowed from convex geometry. We apply the concept to a variety of convex economies and relate it to Pareto optimality. The "magic" of linear equilibrium prices is put into perspective by establishing an analogy between linear functions in the standard convexity and "primitive orderings" in the abstract convexity. (JEL I11, I18, J44, K13)

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• Tirole, J. (2015). Country Solidarity in Sovereign Crises. American Economic Review, 105, 2333–2363.

  When will solidarity, which emerges spontaneously from the fear of spillovers, be reinforced through contracting? The optimal pact between countries that differ substantially in their probability of distress is a simple debt contract with market financing, a borrowing cap, but no joint liability. While joint liability augments total surplus, the borrowing country cannot compensate the deep-pocket guarantor. By contrast, the optimal pact between two countries symmetrically exposed to shocks with an arbitrary correlation is a simple debt contract with joint liability, provided that shocks are sufficiently independent, spillovers sufficiently large, liquidity needs moderate, and available sanctions sufficiently tough. (JEL D86, F34, H63)

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• Voena, A. (2015). Yours, Mine, and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the Intertemporal Behavior of Married Couples? American Economic Review, 105, 2295–2332.

  This paper examines how divorce laws affect couples' intertemporal choices and well-being. Exploiting panel variation in US laws, I estimate the parameters of a model of household decision-making. Household survey data indicate that the introduction of unilateral divorce in states that imposed an equal division of property is associated with higher household savings and lower female employment, implying a distortion in household assets accumulation and a transfer toward wives whose share in household resources is smaller than the one of their husband. When spouses share consumption equally, separate property or prenuptial agreements can reduce distortions and increase equity. (JEL D13, D14, D91, J12, J16, K36)

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• Agarwal, N. (2015). An Empirical Model of the Medical Match. American Economic Review, 105, 1939–1978.

  This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression. Due to residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely cause of low salaries. (JEL C78, I11, J31, J44, K21, L44)

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• Andreoni, J., & Sprenger, C. (2015). Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences: Reply. American Economic Review, 105, 2287–2293.

  Can the well-known experimental phenomenon of present-bias in intertemporal choice be confounded with the risks associated with receiving payment? Can measurements of risk preferences be used to represent desires for smoothness in intertemporal payments? In our two 2012 papers in this journal we explored these two questions and found the answer to the first to be yes and the second to be no. We feel the three papers inspired by our work and published here underscore these arguments and point to interesting new possibilities for modeling and measuring risk over time. (JEL C91, D81, D91)

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• Braguinsky, S., Ohyama, A., Okazaki, T., & Syverson, C. (2015). Acquisitions, Productivity, and Profitability: Evidence from the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry. American Economic Review, 105, 2086–2119.

  We explore how changes in ownership affect the productivity and profitability of producers. Using detailed data from the Japanese cotton spinning industry at the turn of the last century, we find that acquired firms' production facilities were not on average less physically productive than the plants of the acquiring firms before acquisition. They were much less profitable, however, due to higher inventory levels and lower capacity utilization—differences that reflected problems in managing the uncertainties of demand. After acquisitions, less profitable acquired plants saw drops in inventories and gains in capacity utilization that raised both their productivity and profitability levels. (JEL D24, G32, G34, L11, L25, L66, N65)

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• Budish, E., Roin, B. N., & Williams, H. (2015). Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials. American Economic Review, 105, 2044–2085.

  We investigate whether private research investments are distorted away from long-term projects. Our theoretical model highlights two potential sources of this distortion: short-termism and the fixed patent term. Our empirical context is cancer research, where clinical trials—and hence, project durations—are shorter for late-stage cancer treatments relative to early-stage treatments or cancer prevention. Using newly constructed data, we document several sources of evidence that together show private research investments are distorted away from long-term projects. The value of life-years at stake appears large. We analyze three potential policy responses: surrogate (non-mortality) clinical-trial endpoints, targeted R&D subsidies, and patent design. (JEL D92, G31, I11, L65, O31, O34)

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• Caplin, A., & Dean, M. (2015). Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Acquisition. American Economic Review, 105, 2183–2203.

  Apparently mistaken decisions are ubiquitous. To what extent does this reflect irrationality, as opposed to a rational trade-off between the costs of information acquisition and the expected benefits of learning? We develop a revealed preference test that characterizes all patterns of choice "mistakes" consistent with a general model of optimal costly information acquisition and identify the extent to which information costs can be recovered from choice data. (JEL D11, D81, D83)

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• Cheung, S. L. (2015). Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences: On the Elicitation of Time Preference under Conditions of Risk: Comment. American Economic Review, 105, 2242–2260.

  Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a, b) report evidence that distinct utility functions govern choices under certainty and risk. I investigate the robustness of this result to the experimental design. I find that the effect disappears completely when a multiple price list instrument is used instead of a convex time budget design. Alternatively, the effect is reduced by half when sooner and later payment risks are realized using a single lottery instead of two independent lotteries. The result is thus at least partially driven by intertemporal diversification, supporting an explanation in terms of concavity of the intertemporal, and not only atemporal, utility function. (JEL C91, D81, D91)

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• Dequiedt, V., & Martimort, D. (2015). Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism. American Economic Review, 105, 2141–2182.

  We consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral contracts. We highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each relationship. We characterize the set of allocations robust to such opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibility constraints. Those constraints limit the manufacturer's ability to use yardstick competition among retailers. They simplify contracts and restore a rent/efficiency trade-off even with correlated information. We show that sell-out contracts are optimal under a wide range of circumstances. (JEL D21, D86, L14, L60, L81)

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