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'Acting Wife': Marriage Market Incentives and Labor Market Investments

Resource type
Authors/contributors
Title
'Acting Wife': Marriage Market Incentives and Labor Market Investments
Abstract
Do single women avoid career-enhancing actions because these actions signal undesirable traits, like ambition, to the marriage market? While married and unmarried female MBA students perform similarly when their performance is unobserved by classmates (on exams and problem sets), unmarried women have lower participation grades. In a field experiment, single female students reported lower desired salaries and willingness to travel and work long hours on a real-stakes placement questionnaire when they expected their classmates to see their preferences. Other groups' responses were unaffected by peer observability. A second experiment indicates the effects are driven by observability by single male peers.
Publication
American Economic Review
Volume
107
Issue
11
Pages
3288-3319
Date
2017-11
Citation
Bursztyn, L., Fujiwara, T., & Pallais, A. (2017). “Acting Wife”: Marriage Market Incentives and Labor Market Investments. American Economic Review, 107, 3288–3319.
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