A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
Your search
Results 136 resources
-
A central result in the theory of adverse selection in asset markets is that informed sellers can signal quality and obtain higher prices by delaying trade. This paper provides some of the first evidence of a signaling mechanism through trade delays using the residential mortgage market as a laboratory. We find a strong relationship between mortgage performance and time to sale for privately securitized mortgages. Additionally, deals made up of more seasoned mortgages are sold at lower yields. These effects are strongest in the “Alt-A” segment of the market, where mortgages are often sold with incomplete hard information, and in cases where the originator and the issuer of mortgage-backed securities are not affiliated.
-
We use a large housing transaction data set in Singapore to study whether real estate agents use information advantages to buy houses at bargain prices. Agents bought their own houses at prices that are 2.54% lower than comparable houses bought by other buyers. Consistent with information asymmetries, agent buyers have more information advantages in less informative environments, and agent buyers are more likely to buy houses from agent sellers. Agent discounts are from both “cherry picking” and bargaining power, and bargaining power contributes more to the agent discounts. Agents’ advantage consists in their information of available houses and previous purchase prices.
-
This paper asks whether dissent votes in uncontested director elections have consequences for directors. We show that contrary to popular belief based on prior studies, shareholder votes have power and result in negative consequences for directors. Directors facing dissent are more likely to depart boards, especially if they are not lead directors or chairs of important committees. Directors facing dissent who do not leave are moved to less prominent positions on boards. Finally, we find evidence that directors facing dissent face reduced opportunities in the market for directors. We also find that the effects of dissent votes go beyond those of proxy advisor recommendations.
-
This study investigates how firms are affected by the separation of commercial and investment banking, using unique data from the dissolution of Japan’s Daiwa Securities SMBC, a joint venture investment bank. This event prevented its client firms from receiving a combination of lending and underwriting services. After the dissolution, these firms experienced a sharper decline in market value, more frequent switching of seasoned equity offering (SEO) underwriters, and the disappearance of lower SEO discounts when they had close lending relationships with Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, the ex-parent commercial bank. Thus, separating the two banking businesses would impose costs on firms.
-
We show significant US monetary policy (MP) spillovers to international bond markets. Our methodology identifies US MP shocks as the change in short-term Treasury yields around Federal Open Market Committee meetings and traces their effects on international bond yields using panel regressions. We emphasize three main results. First, US MP spillovers to long-term yields have increased substantially after the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. Second, spillovers are large compared with the effects of other events, and at least as large as the effects of domestic MP after 2008. Third, spillovers work through different channels, concentrated in risk-neutral rates (expectations of future MP rates) for developed countries, but predominantly on term premia in emerging markets. In interpreting these findings, we provide evidence consistent with an exchange rate channel, according to which foreign central banks face a trade-off between narrowing MP rate differentials or experiencing currency movements against the US dollar. Developed countries adjust in a manner consistent with freely floating regimes, responding partially with risk-neutral rates and partially through currency adjustments. Instead, emerging countries display patterns consistent with foreign exchange interventions, which cushion the response of exchange rates but reinforce capital flows and their effects in bond yields through movements in term premia. Our results suggest that the endogenous effects of currency interventions on long-term yields should be added into the standard cost-benefit analysis of such policies.
-
We perform transaction-level analyses of entrusted loans, one of the largest components of shadow banking in China. Entrusted loans involve firms with privileged access to cheap capital channeling funds to less privileged firms, and the increase when credit is tight. Nonaffiliated loans have much higher interest rates than both affiliated loans and official bank loans, and they largely flow into real estate. The pricing of entrusted loans, especially of nonaffiliated loans, incorporates fundamental and informational risks. Stock market reactions suggest that both affiliated and nonaffiliated loans are fairly compensated investments.
-
We study whether personal experiences are so powerful that they make individuals actively shy away from risk. Our research design relies on portfolio decisions relating to inheritances, which alter the active decision from one of choosing to take risk to one of choosing to reduce risk. Experience derives from investments in banks that defaulted following the 2007–2009 financial crisis. We classify experiences into first-hand experiences, resulting from personal losses; second-hand experiences, from losses of family members; and third-hand experiences, from locations where banks defaulted. Our results demonstrate that experiences gained personally, not common shocks, make individuals shy away from risk.
-
We show that the relation between aggregate investment and Tobin’s q has become remarkably tight in recent years, contrasting with earlier times. We connect this change with the growing empirical dispersion in Tobin’s q, which we show both in the cross-section and the time series. To study the source of this dispersion, we augment a standard investment model with two distinct mechanisms related to firms’ research activities: innovations and learning. Both innovation jumps in cash flows and the frequent updating of beliefs about future cash flows endogenously amplify volatility in the firm’s value function. Perhaps counterintuitively, the investment-q regression works better for research-intensive industries, a growing segment of the economy, despite their greater stock of intangible assets. We confirm the model’s predictions in the data, and we disentangle the results from measurement error in q.
-
We model a firm’s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either Chapter 11 reorganization or Chapter 7 liquidation. Creditors anticipate equityholders’ ex-post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex-ante credit spreads. Using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization, we show that the off-equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage, even with liquidation in equilibrium. If reorganization is less efficient than liquidation, the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex-ante, even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path.
-
We study the human capital effects of private equity buyouts in Germany. We conduct matched-sample difference-in-differences estimations at the establishment and at the individual employee level with more than 152 thousand buyout employees and a carefully matched control group. Buyouts are followed by a reduction in overall employment and an increase in employee turnover. Employees of buyout targets experience earnings declines equivalent to 2.8% of median earnings in the fifth year after the buyout. Managers and older employees fare far worse after buyouts compared with the average target employee, even though they are not more likely to lose their jobs at the target compared with other employees. We argue that the employees most negatively affected after buyouts are those who are less likely to find new employment, not those who are most likely to lose their jobs. Evidence exists of a reduction in administrative staff and more hiring for jobs that require IT skills.
Explore
Journals
Topic
- Bond (15)
- Director (4)
- Capital Structure (3)
- CEO (3)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (1)
Resource type
- Journal Article (136)