A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 205 resources
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We study whether carbon emissions affect the cross-section of US stock returns. We find that stocks of firms with higher total carbon dioxide emissions (and changes in emissions) earn higher returns, controlling for size, book-to-market, and other return predictors. We cannot explain this carbon premium through differences in unexpected profitability or other known risk factors. We also find that institutional investors implement exclusionary screening based on direct emission intensity (the ratio of total emissions to sales) in a few salient industries. Overall, our results are consistent with an interpretation that investors are already demanding compensation for their exposure to carbon emission risk.
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We directly measure banks’ monitoring of syndicated loans. Banks typically demand borrower information on at least a monthly basis. About 20% of loans involve active monitoring (i.e., site visits or third-party appraisals). Monitoring increases with the lead bank’s incentives and the value of information and is negatively associated with loan spreads and maturity. The monitoring captured by our measures can either complement or substitute for covenant-based monitoring, depending on whether the monitoring informs covenant compliance. Banks increase monitoring following deteriorations in borrower financial condition and credit line drawdowns. Finally, monitoring is positively related to future covenant violations and loan renegotiations.
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We model endogenous technology adoption and competition among liquidity providers with access to High-Frequency Trading (HFT) technology. HFT technology provides speed and information advantages. Information advantages may restore excessively toxic markets. Speed advantages may reduce resource costs for liquidity provision. Both effects increase liquidity and welfare. However, informationally advantaged HFTs may impose a winner’s curse on traditional market makers, who in response reduce their participation. This increases resource costs and lowers the execution likelihood for market orders, thereby reducing liquidity and welfare. This result also holds when HFT technology dominates traditional technology in terms of costs and informational advantages.
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While popular with policymakers, most evidence on consumer financial disclosure’s effectiveness studies borrowing decisions (where optimality is unclear) or lab experiments (where attention is not scarce). We provide field evidence from randomized controlled trials with 124,000 savings account holders at five UK depositories. Treated consumers were disclosed varying degrees of salient information about alternative products, including one with their current provider strictly dominating their current product. Despite switching taking roughly 15 minutes and the moderate average potential gains ($190/year), switching is rare across disclosure designs and depositors. We find pessimistic beliefs drive disclosure inattention and limit disclosure’s effectiveness, helping explain deposit stickiness.
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Theoretical models of groups suggest that sub-group usage can affect communication among members and group decision-making. To examine the trade-offs from forming sub-groups, we assemble a detailed dataset on corporate boards (groups) and committees (sub-groups). Boards have increasingly used committees formally staffed entirely by outside directors. Our data show that twenty-five percent of all director meetings occurred in such committees in 1996; this increased to 45% by 2010. Our evidence suggests that granting formal authority to such committees can impair communication and decision-making. Sub-groups are relatively understudied, but our results suggest that they play an important role in group functioning and corporate governance.
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We study a dynamic voluntary disclosure setting where the manager’s information and the firm’s value evolve over time. The manager is not limited in her disclosure opportunities, but disclosure is costly. The results show that the manager discloses even if this leads to a price decrease in the current period. The manager absorbs this price drop in order to increase her option value of withholding disclosure in the future. That is, by disclosing today, the manager can improve her continuation value. The results provide a number of novel empirical predictions regarding asset prices and disclosure patterns over time. These include, among others, that disclosures are negatively correlated in time, and stock return skewness is negatively correlated with lagged returns for firms with low uncertainty over their future profitability, in more competitive industries, and in industries with less informative public news.
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We use a new data set on macroprudential foreign exchange (FX) regulations to evaluate their effectiveness and unintended consequences. Our results support the predictions of a model in which banks and markets lend in different currencies, but only banks can screen firm productivity. Regulations significantly reduce bank FX borrowing, and firms respond by increasing FX debt issuance. Moreover, regulations reduce bank sensitivity to exchange rates but are less effective at reducing the sensitivity of the broader economy. Therefore, FX regulations mitigate bank vulnerability to currency fluctuations and the global financial cycle, but appear to partially shift the snowbanks of vulnerability elsewhere.
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Powerful politicians can interfere with the enforcement of regulations. As such, expected political interference can affect constituents’ behavior. Using rotations of Senate committee chairs to identify variation in political power and expected regulatory relief, we study powerful politicians’ effect on consumer lending to communities protected by fair-lending regulations. We find a 7.5% reduction in credit access to minority neighborhoods in states with new committee chairs. Larger reductions occur in Community Reinvestment Act-eligible neighborhoods and when Senators serve on committees that oversee the enforcement of fair-lending laws. Banks headquartered in powerful Senators’ states are responsible for the reduction in credit access.
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We exploit a natural experiment in which two very similar investment subsidies were implemented in the same country, two years apart: once during a period of economic stability, and once during a period of very high uncertainty. Using rich administrative data, we find that, under low uncertainty, tax incentives have strong positive effects on average investment. Under high uncertainty, however, the story is different: there is vast heterogeneity in responses, with the firms that are sheltered from elevated uncertainty responding strongly to the policy, and the firms that are exposed to high uncertainty driving a drop in responses. This implies that periods of stability offer an important policy opportunity to encourage investment, and the impact of stimulus in crises depends on the distribution of firms in their exposure to uncertainty.
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Technology transformed the trading of financial assets but has been slower to come to corporate bond trading. Combining proprietary data from MarketAxess with regulatory TRACE data, we investigate how electronic request for quote (RFQ) trading affects bond dealers and trading more generally. We demonstrate that electronic trading remains fairly small and segmented, but has wide-ranging effects on transaction costs and execution quality in both electronic and voice trading, and the interdealer market. We identify features particular to bond markets that have and could continue to limit electronic bond trading growth. We provide an intriguing portrait of a market in transition.
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Journals
Topic
- Bond (22)
- CEO (6)
- Director (4)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (3)
- Capital Structure (1)
Resource type
- Journal Article (205)