A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 74 resources
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We develop a unified theory of dynamic contracting and assortative matching to explain firm dynamics. In our model, neither firms nor managers can commit to arrangements that yield lower payoffs than their outside options, which are microfounded by the equilibrium conditions in a matching market. The model endogenously generates power laws in firm size and CEO compensation, and explains differences in their right tails. We also show that our model quantitatively accounts for many salient features of the time‐series dynamics and the cross‐sectional distribution of firm investment, dividend payout, and CEO compensation.
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We study how parent liability for subsidiaries' environmental cleanup costs affects industrial pollution and production. Our empirical setting exploits a Supreme Court decision that strengthened parent limited liability protection for some subsidiaries. Using a difference‐in‐differences framework, we find that stronger liability protection for parents leads to a 5% to 9% increase in toxic emissions by subsidiaries. Evidence suggests the increase in pollution is driven by lower investment in abatement technologies rather than increased production. Cross‐sectional tests suggest convexities associated with insolvency and executive compensation drive heterogeneous effects. Overall, our findings highlight the moral hazard problem associated with limited liability.
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Using loan‐level data on millions of used‐car transactions across hundreds of lenders, we study the consumer response to exogenous variation in credit terms. Borrowers offered shorter maturity decrease expenditures enough to offset 60% to 90% of the monthly payment increase. Most of this is driven by shifting toward lower‐quality cars, but affected borrowers offset 20% to 30% of a monthly payment shock by negotiating lower prices for equivalent cars. Our results suggest that durable goods prices adjust to reflect credit terms even at the individual level, with one year of additional loan maturity increasing a car's price by 2.8%.
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We study an at‐scale natural experiment in which debit cards were given to cash transfer recipients who already had a bank account. Using administrative account data and household surveys, we find that beneficiaries accumulated a savings stock equal to 2% of annual income after two years with the card. The increase in formal savings represents an increase in overall savings, financed by a reduction in current consumption. There are two mechanisms. First, debit cards reduce transaction costs of accessing money. Second, they reduce monitoring costs, which led beneficiaries to check their account balances frequently and build trust in the bank.
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The importance of skilled labor and the inalienability of human capital expose firms to the risk of losing talent at critical times. Using Swedish microdata, we document that firms lose workers with the highest cognitive and noncognitive skills as they approach bankruptcy. In a quasi‐experiment, we confirm that financial distress drives these results: following a negative export shock caused by exogenous currency movements, talent abandons the firm, but only if the exporter is highly leveraged. Consistent with talent dependence being associated with higher labor costs of financial distress, firms that rely more on talent have more conservative capital structures.
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Based on a survey of American Finance Association members, we analyze how demographics, time allocation, production mechanisms, and institutional factors affect research production during the pandemic. Consistent with the literature, research productivity falls more for women and faculty with young children. Independently, and novel, extra time spent on teaching (much more likely for women) negatively affects research productivity. Also novel, concerns about feedback, isolation, and health have large negative research effects, which disproportionately affect junior faculty and PhD students. Finally, faculty who express greater concerns about employers’ finances report larger negative research effects and more concerns about feedback, isolation, and health.
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We present a new model of asset prices in which investors evaluate risk according to prospect theory and examine its ability to explain 23 prominent stock market anomalies. The model incorporates all of the elements of prospect theory, accounts for investors' prior gains and losses, and makes quantitative predictions about an asset's average return based on empirical estimates of the asset's return volatility, return skewness, and past capital gain. We find that the model can help explain a majority of the 23 anomalies.
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We study whether firm and macroeconomic announcements that convey systematic information generate a return premium for firms that experience information spillovers. We use information consumption to proxy for investor learning during these announcements and construct ex ante measures of expected information consumption (EIC) to calibrate whether learning is priced. On days when there are information spillovers, affected stocks earn a significant return premium (5% annualized) and the capital asset pricing model performs better. The positive effect of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee announcements on the risk premia of individual stocks appears to be modulated by EIC. Our findings are most consistent with a risk‐based explanation.
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I develop a structural model of mortgage demand and lender competition to study how leverage regulation affects the U.K. mortgage market. Using variation in risk‐weighted capital requirements across lenders and mortgages with different loan‐to‐values (LTVs), I show that a 1‐percentage‐point increase in risk‐weighted capital requirements increases lenders' marginal cost of originating mortgages by about 26 basis points (11%) on average. I use the estimated model to study proposed leverage regulations. Counterfactual analyses show that large lenders exploit a regulatory cost advantage, which increases concentration by about 20%, and suggest that banning high‐LTV mortgages may reduce large lenders' equity buffer.
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In our target‐initiated theory of takeovers, a target approaches potential acquirers that privately know their standalone values and merger synergies, where higher synergy acquirers tend to have larger standalone values. Despite their information disadvantage, targets can extract all surplus when synergies and standalone values are concavely related by offering payment choices that are combinations of cash and equity. Targets exploit the reluctance of high‐valuation acquirers to cede equity claims, inducing them to bid more cash. When synergies and standalone values are not concavely related, sellers can gain by combining cash with securities that are more information sensitive than equities.
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- Bond (12)
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- Journal Article (74)