A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

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Results 202 resources

  • Is climate change partisanship reflected in residential decisions? Comparing individual properties in the same zip code with similar elevation and proximity to the coast, houses exposed to sea level rise (SLR) are increasingly more likely to be owned by Republicans and less likely to be owned by Democrats. We find a partisan residency gap for even moderately SLR exposed properties of more than 5 percentage points, which has more than doubled over the past six years. Findings are unchanged controlling flexibly for other individual demographics and a variety of granular property characteristics, including the value of the home. Residential sorting manifests among owners regardless of occupancy, but not among renters, and is driven by long-run SLR exposure but not current flood risk. Anticipatory sorting on climate change suggests that households that are most likely to vote against climate friendly policies and least likely to adapt may ultimately bear the burden of climate change.

  • Sentiment should exhibit its strongest effects on asset prices at times when valuations are most subjective. Accordingly, we show that a one-standard-deviation increase in aggregate uncertainty amplifies the predictive ability of sentiment for market returns by two to four times relative to when uncertainty is at its mean. For the cross-section of returns, the predictive ability of sentiment for assets expected to be most sensitive to sentiment, including existing measures of both risk and mispricing, is substantially larger in times of higher uncertainty. The results hold for both daily and monthly proxies for sentiment and for various proxies for uncertainty.

  • Using detailed loan holding data of Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs), we document empirical evidence for the fire sale of leveraged loans due to leverage constraints on CLOs. Constrained CLOs are forced to sell loans downgraded to CCC or below, and thus loans widely held by constrained CLOs experience temporary price depreciation. This instability is exacerbated by diversification requirements. As the CLO market grows, each CLO’s effort to diversify its portfolio leads to similarity in loan holdings among CLOs, and thus their leverage constraints simultaneously bind. CLOs’ overlapping loan holdings spread idiosyncratic shocks to large borrowers to the overall leveraged loan market.

  • We examine how product life cycle affects investment and financing by estimating an industry equilibrium model that embeds product portfolio characteristics. In the model, firms trade off higher profitability of newer products versus product introduction costs. Using product-level data, we find that the product dimension is critical in quantitatively explaining cash flow dynamics, corporate policies, and industry structure. We show that product introductions and capital investment are complements and that product dynamics incentivize preserving more debt capacity. Our estimates reveal that product life cycle is more pronounced for firms with smaller and more concentrated product portfolios as well as those with high product variety.

  • We analyze the strategic interaction between undercapitalized banks and a supervisor in a recovery and resolution framework in which early recapitalizations can prevent later disorderly failures. Capital forbearance emerges because reputational, political, economic and fiscal costs undermine supervisors’ commitment to publicly resolve the banks that miss the request to privately recover. Under a weaker resolution threat, banks’ incentives to recover are lower and supervisors may end up having to resolve more banks. When marginal resolution costs steeply increase with the scale of the intervention, private recovery actions become strategic complements, producing too-many-to-resolve equilibria with high forbearance and high systemic costs.

  • We study governance when shareholders vote and can also buy or sell shares. We find that voting for the policy that one believes is better for the firm maximizes portfolio value only when pivotal; otherwise, it is better to vote against one’s information, distort the market, and then trade at the distorted price. Equilibrium voting informativeness balances these forces and is demonstrably low. As the number of shareholders grows, the probability of making the correct decision becomes lower than the informational quality of just one shareholder’s private signal. Despite this, shareholders extract information rents from trading and thus obtain additional value from their private information. These effects are related to the level of direct information leakage in the market. The predicted patterns of trading and market volatility help reconcile several debates.

  • I present closed-form solutions for prices, portfolios, and beliefs in a model where four types of investors trade assets over time: naive investors who learn via a social network, “fanatics” possibly spreading fake news, and rational short- and long-term investors. I show that fanatic and rational views dominate over time, and their relative importance depends on their following by influencers. Securities markets exhibit social network spillovers, large effects of influencers and thought leaders, bubbles, bursts of high volume, price momentum, fundamental momentum, and reversal. The model sheds new light on the GameStop event, historical bubbles, and asset markets more generally.

  • Following state-level legal changes that increase labor dismissal costs, firms increase their innovation in new processes that facilitate the adoption of cost-saving production methods, especially in industries with a large share of labor costs in total costs. Firms with high innovation ability exhibit larger increases in process innovation and capital-labor ratios, an effect driven by both increases in capital investment and decreases in employment. By facilitating the adjustment of the input mix when conditions in input markets change, innovation ability allows firms to mitigate value losses and is a key driver of their performance.

  • We investigate equilibrium debt dynamics for a firm that cannot commit to a future debt policy and is subject to a fixed restructuring cost. We formally characterize equilibria when the firm is not required to repurchase outstanding debt prior to issuing additional debt. For realistic values of issuance costs and debt maturity, the no-commitment policy generates tax benefits that are similar to those obtained by a benchmark policy with commitment. For positive but arbitrarily small issuance costs, there are maturities for which shareholders extract essentially the entire claim to cash-flows.

  • Bond underwriters, lacking “Greenshoe options” and formal systems to track “flipping” activity, have fewer tools than equity underwriters to manage secondary market order flow uncertainty. We show that bond underwriters respond by selectively “overallocating” some issues to attain net short positions. Overallocations are economically substantive, facilitate the syndicate's price stabilization efforts, and are largely offset in the days after issuance. These issues on average experience more net selling by institutional investors and, despite large syndicate purchases, appreciate less in the secondary market. Thus, overallocation is an observable indicator that underwriters anticipate weakness in net secondary market demand.

Last update from database: 5/16/24, 11:00 PM (AEST)