Knowledge that Transforms

Journal Article A Growth Model for a Tenured-labor-managed Firm: Reply Get access André Sapir André Sapir University of Wisconsin, Madison Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 98, Issue 3, August 1983, Page 543, https://doi.org/10.2307/1886029 Published: 01 August 1983

Journal Article The Impact of Monopoly Pricing on the Lerner Symmetry Theorem: Reply Get access Edward John Ray Edward John Ray Ohio State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 98, Issue 3, August 1983, Pages 535–537, https://doi.org/10.2307/1886027 Published: 01 August 1983

Journal Article Import Objective, Distortions, and Optimal Tax Structure: A Generalization Get access Arvind Panagariya Arvind Panagariya University of Maryland Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 98, Issue 3, August 1983, Pages 515–524, https://doi.org/10.2307/1886024 Published: 01 August 1983

Chao-cheng Mai, Jeong-wen Chiang; Transport Costs in International Trade Theory: A Comparison with the Analysis of Nontraded Goods—A Note, The Quarterly Jo

Steady State Growth of the Long-Run Sales-Maximizing Firm: Comment Get access Yoshihiko Seoka Yoshihiko Seoka Osaka City University, Japan Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 98, Issue 4, November 1983, Pages 713–719, https://doi.org/10.2307/1881786 Published: 01 November 1983

Journal Article A Growth Model for a Tenured-labor-managed Firm: Comment Get access David de Meza David de Meza London School of Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 98, Issue 3, August 1983, Pages 539–542, https://doi.org/10.2307/1886028 Published: 01 August 1983

The paper examines job contracts consisting of a promotion procedure and a wage structure, which cause individuals of different ability to self-select into different jobs. It is established that although the promotion procedure is imperfect (as firms cannot directly obtain perfect information about workers) contracts exist that induce workers to reveal their ability through job choice. Such contracts support an informationally consistent equilibrium. In the equilibrium a proportion of individuals of each ability level are promoted. The paper examines the transformation this induces from the distribution of ability in the population to a distribution of earnings.

The paper employs the intergenerational model to derive the demands for domestic and foreign currencies from microeconomic optimizing behavior. In the absence of government policy, we obtain the Kareken and Wallace result that exchange rates are constant and indeterminate. We discuss the reasons why nations may find it in their interests to impose probabilistic capital controls. It is shown that the imposition of probabilistic capital controls yields a unique (generally nonstationary) exchange rate path and that this path is determined in accord with the Monetary Approach. As the probability of controls tends to zero, the exchange rate remains determinate.

Journal Article Schumpeter and Marx on Capitalist Transformation Get access John E. Elliott John E. Elliott University of Southern California Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 98, Issue 2, May 1983, Pages 333–336, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885629 Published: 01 May 1983