Knowledge that Transforms

The PCAOB posits that audit partner and manager involvement, primarily through greater supervision and review (“oversight”) of audit engagements, is an important determinant and indicator of audit quality. We test this notion by empirically examining the link between staffing leverage, as measured by an office's ratio of audit partners and managers to audit employees, and audit outcomes from 2008 to 2022. We find staffing leverage is associated with lower rates of client misstatements, comment letters, and PCAOB inspection deficiencies, suggesting higher audit quality. When disaggregated, the association pertains to both partners and nonpartner managers. This relation is stronger for more complex clients and for offices with better management. We also find that staffing leverage measured at the firm level predicts audit quality, and that both office‐ and firm‐level staffing leverage are incrementally informative of audit quality, suggesting disclosing audit oversight metrics at multiple levels could be beneficial. However, the association between firm‐level staffing leverage and audit quality is statistically detected only within Big 4 audits. These findings suggest that audit committees, investors, and regulators can use audit‐office partner‐staffing and manager‐staffing leverage as an informative indicator of audit quality, particularly for complex engagements.

We present a model of competition between environmental, social, and governance (ESG) raters who acquire information about multiple unrelated categories and sell ratings. Raters specializing in different categories maximize the amount of information transmitted and surplus, and can be an equilibrium outcome. When investors place a high value on ESG performance across multiple categories, the unique equilibrium is for the raters to generalize—splitting their effort among the categories, resulting in less informative ratings. Greenwashing by firms can make generalization the only equilibrium. We also demonstrate that specialization maximizes ratings disagreement, and thus empirical measures of disagreement may be poor measures of surplus.

We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary the information available to participants, complete or incomplete, and the surplus structure, supermodular or submodular. Several insights emerge. First, while markets often culminate in efficient matchings, stability is more elusive, reflecting the difficulty of arranging attendant transfers. Second, incomplete information and submodularity present hurdles to efficiency and especially stability; their combination drastically diminishes stability's likelihood. Third, matchings form ``from the top down'' in complete-information supermodular markets, but exhibit many more and less-obviously ordered offers otherwise. Last, participants' market positions matter far more than their dynamic bargaining styles for outcomes.

We show that the emergence of new economic opportunities that draw women away from their traditional domestic roles has significantly influenced the adoption of religious veiling. We measure the prevalence of veiling among young women across Indonesia’s districts for more than two decades by hand-coding around a quarter million photographs attached to Indonesia’s public high school registers. To establish causality, we exploit exogenous variation generated by international demand for Indonesia’s products, interacted with the gender and sectoral composition of local industries. Districts exposed to stronger positive economic shocks—and thus greater economic opportunities for women—exhibit higher rates of veiling adoption. Our findings suggest that veiling facilitates young women’s participation in formal labor markets while safeguarding their personal and social image in society.

We estimate the impact of public pension incentives on labor supply far from the normal retirement age by exploiting Poland's switch from a Defined Benefit to a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) scheme. This reform created a sharp cohort-based discontinuity in the link between current pension contributions and future benefits. Using this discontinuity and the universe of taxpayers, we estimate an employment elasticity with respect to the net return to work of 0.51 for men at ages 51-54. We estimate a lifecycle model to match these responses and discuss the broader implications of the reform. The shift to NDC reallocates work incentives over the lifecycle, strengthening incentives at younger ages, when labor supply is relatively inelastic, and weakening them at older ages, when labor supply is more elastic. This reallocation of work incentives tends to reduce aggregate lifecycle labor supply, which highlights the advantage of targeting pension incentives towards ages at which labor supply is most responsive.

Do workers from social groups with comparable productivity distributions obtain comparable lifetime earnings? We study how a small amount of early-career discrimination propagates over time when workers’ productivity is revealed through employment. In breakdown learning environments that primarily track on-the-job failures, such discrimination spirals into a substantial lifetime earnings gap for groups of comparable productivity, whereas in breakthrough learning environments that track successes, early-career discrimination can be self-corrected, so comparable groups obtain comparable lifetime earnings. This contrast persists in large labor markets and with flexible wages, inconclusive learning, and misspecified employer beliefs.

This study examines the relation between taxes and business investment using the setting of an unexpected and economically significant federal corporate income tax rate increase in Canada known colloquially as the Halloween Massacre of 2006. This tax increase only applies to firms organized as income trusts, but not corporations. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that investment by income trusts decreases about 0.67% for each 1 percentage point increase in the tax rate, translating into over $10 billion in reduced aggregate investment. In decomposing total investment, our results reveal that capital expenditures exhibit an immediate decrease while there is a delayed decrease in acquisition activity. Our results are concentrated in high‐investment income trusts that are most sensitive to the link between investment and taxes. Our study helps resolve conflicting prior results by providing robust evidence that tax increases have an economically significant and negative causal effect on business investment.