Knowledge that Transforms

We study a macroprudential regulation in the emerging market of Chile that raised loan-loss provisions for residential mortgages with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios above 80%. The policy reduced high-LTV borrowing and overall leverage but unintentionally affected households likely to borrow above 80% LTV based on preregulation characteristics. These borrowers liquidated term deposits to meet higher down payments, lowering liquidity and raising short-term delinquency, especially near the threshold. The results uncover a regulatory trade-off: systemic risk is curbed, but financially constrained households face short-term vulnerability.

Policymakers claim that combating tax avoidance can help reduce industry concentration by leveling the playing field between industry leaders and their competitors. We test the validity of this claim by using administrative data on industry concentration and exploiting the staggered introduction of anti-tax avoidance regulations across 17 European countries. Although these regulations significantly reduce tax avoidance, we find no statistically or economically meaningful effect on industry concentration. Further tests indicate that our nonresults stem from a genuine lack of effect rather than a lack of statistical power and that our inferences are robust to multiple research designs. The sole exception is in industries with both high levels of leader tax-avoidance advantages and multinational presence, but even in these industries, effect sizes are modest and fall short of regulatory benchmarks. Overall, our findings cast doubt on the idea that broad-based anti-tax avoidance regulations can materially influence industry concentration.

We collect data on ranges of hypothetical asset liquidation values disclosed in U.S. Bankruptcy Court filings. We use this historical information to construct a firm-specific measure, “RecRisk,” which captures asset recovery risk through the uncertainty surrounding asset valuations in liquidation events. We document that higher RecRisk is associated with smaller syndicated loan amounts as a percentage of available collateral, more and tighter performance covenants, and increased loan spreads for borrowers with high credit risk. High RecRisk borrowers also experience lower secondary loan market prices and reduced liquidity for loans with high credit risk. When borrowers become financially distressed, high RecRisk is further associated with declining loan prices and reduced ownership by Collateralized Loan Obligations, the dominant investors in the leveraged loan market. Overall, our results indicate that loan contract terms and prices reflect recovery risk faced by lenders. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. The authors can provide the RecRisk measure at the firm-year level upon request.

Annuities, long‐term care insurance, and reverse mortgages remain puzzlingly unpopular to manage post‐retirement longevity, health, and housing price risks. We use a flexible life‐cycle model structurally estimated with a unique stated‐preference survey experiment of Canadian households to understand why. Key factors include high risk aversion, concern over long‐run risks, strong discounting of valuation in disability states, imperfect housing substitutability, and bequest motives. The remaining disinterest is accounted for by information frictions and inertia. We also document evidence of public insurance crowding out, spousal co‐insurance, and responsiveness to product bundling.