Knowledge that Transforms

Why do so few women become CEOs? To understand this glass ceiling, we estimate a dynamic model of the CEO gender decision, which contains perceived gender productivity differences, search costs reflecting limited female labor supply, and employer disutility from discrimination. The key factor is the shortage of suitable female candidates, as boards prefer hiring women, and productivity differences between genders are minimal. We find no evidence of a glass cliff in which women become CEOs just as firms are failing. While better governance is associated with women becoming CEOs, the importance of limited female labor supply is unrelated to governance.

We study how fatal and nonfatal health shocks affect households’ ability to meet their financial obligations. We find that fatal shocks substantially increase the likelihood of default and that housing wealth plays a key role as a self-insurance mechanism. Surviving spouses who experience the largest income losses are more likely to sell their homes, and those without housing wealth face a sharply higher risk of debt collection. In the most financially vulnerable families, these shocks even generate intergenerational spillovers. In contrast, nonfatal health shocks lead to only modest increases in default risk. Taken together, our findings suggest that strengthening survivors’ benefits for households with limited resources could improve welfare across generations.

We find that banking relationships built through institutional cross‐ownership influence the granting of loans as well as loan contract terms. Firms that are newly added to institutional cross‐owners' portfolios are more likely to borrow from banks that previously issued loans to other firms within the same portfolio. These related banks charge lower loan interest spreads and offer greater loan amounts than other banks issuing loans to the same borrower. However, such loans also are more likely to include capital covenants in the presence of high shareholder–debtholder conflicts. Thus, lenders appear to value the benefits of common institutional ownership while still protecting themselves against potential risk shifting. The interest spread effect is stronger for borrowers with high information asymmetry, low accounting quality, more financial distress risk, and dedicated institutional common owners. These results are consistent with either direct information flows or indirect signaling effects and are robust to different fixed effects specifications as well as to an identification strategy that exploits common ownership stemming from financial institution mergers. Overall, our study provides evidence that investor networks play a beneficial role in the production and dissemination of contracting‐relevant information and highlights cross‐ownership as a favorable determinant for contracting efficiency beyond traditional accounting measures.

Whereas prior studies primarily examine how environmental shocks affect manufacturing, distribution, and supply chains, we examine a distinct and understudied channel: the effect of wildfire smoke on human capital operating from firm headquarters. Using satellite‐based smoke plume measures, we show that wildfire smoke exposure in a firm's headquarters county is associated with lower operating income, with effects strengthening as smoke becomes more frequent and severe. Exposure is associated with increased employee health concerns, higher employee turnover, and shorter tenure. The negative association is stronger for firms that rely more heavily on skilled employees, and it is concentrated in higher operating costs. Collectively, these findings are consistent with wildfire smoke impairing workforce stability and productivity. Our study points to the need for enhanced climate‐risk and human‐capital disclosures. It also informs HR managers' planning for absenteeism and employee well‐being, and helps investors, audit committees, and auditors better assess smoke‐related operating risks.

We propose a new method to estimate the marginal value of capital under minimal assumptions. By combining asset prices with fundamentals, our method provides a quasi‐model‐free marginal q together with a simple correction for measurement error in (average) Tobin's Q using linear regressions. Marginal q yields plausible and robust estimates of adjustment costs and investment sensitivities to fundamentals. The widening gap between marginal q and Tobin's Q is driven primarily by market power and intangible capital. Our novel findings strongly support the neoclassical theory of investment and challenge the widespread use of Tobin's Q as proxy for investment opportunities.

A majority of small U.S. businesses attempting to reorganize in bankruptcy fail to do so. Subchapter V of Chapter 11 (SubV) streamlines bankruptcy for small firms by reducing bankruptcy costs and negotiation frictions, and enables entrepreneurs to retain ownership. We show that many businesses reorganize under SubV that otherwise would liquidate. Creditor recoveries and postbankruptcy survival rates are at least as high in SubV as in traditional Chapter 11s. Our results show the increase in reorganizations is not associated with continuation of unviable firms, and that creditors are not harmed by a shift in bargaining power toward small business owners.