We examine the implications of GAAP earnings forecast quality for accounting research. Using a tax law change with an estimable and material GAAP earnings impact, we find that analysts’ GAAP forecasts generally fail to incorporate this impact, whereas investors respond promptly, suggesting that GAAP forecasts omit earnings information deemed relevant by investors and are of low quality. Analyzing quarterly GAAP forecasts from 2004–2019 and classifying GAAP forecasts that equal their street counterparts when GAAP and street actuals differ as low quality, we again find widespread low GAAP forecast quality. Low quality GAAP forecasts affect research inferences: they dampen GAAP earnings response coefficient (ERC) estimates, reduce the explanatory power of GAAP surprises for returns, affect inferences regarding market rewards for meeting-or-beating via exclusions, and understate the extent that GAAP forecasts incorporate exclusion components. We propose two strategies to mitigate the adverse effects of low quality GAAP forecasts on research inferences. Data Availability: Data are from publicly available sources as identified within the manuscript.

We quantify measurable benefits and costs of exempting firms from auditor oversight of internal control effectiveness disclosures. We measure the benefit of exemption as an aggregate 388 million in audit fee savings from 2007–2014. The costs stem from internal control misreporting: an aggregate 719 million of lower operating performance due to non-remediation and a $935 million delay in aggregate market value decline due to the failure to disclose ineffective internal controls. The audit fee savings benefit shareholders of all exempt firms, whereas the costs are borne by shareholders of only a fraction of exempt firms (the internal control misreporters).

Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 34 (GASB 34, 1999) standardized financial reporting and disclosure requirements for U.S. state and local governments. We interpret debt issuing patterns surrounding GASB 34 implementation as evidence of strategic behavior by governments in anticipation of GASB 34 consequences. Specifically, governments that expected more favorable post-GASB 34 evaluations by municipal bond investors delayed new uninsured debt issues until after, whereas governments that expected less favorable evaluations accelerated debt issues to before, GASB 34 information became publicly available. Governments expecting favorable consequences were more likely than governments expecting adverse consequences to substitute away from insured debt and toward uninsured debt, and to choose new debt financing rather than alternative financing sources following GASB 34. These findings are consistent with the notion that expectations about GASB 34 consequences were realized, and that standardization created through GASB 34 facilitated separation in the municipal debt market. Data Availability: Data are from publicly available sources identified in the manuscript.

An extensive literature examines the causes and effects of financial misconduct based on samples drawn from four popular databases that identify restatements, securities class action lawsuits, and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). We show that the results from empirical tests can depend on which database is accessed. To examine the causes of such discrepancies, we compare the information in each database to a detailed sample of 1,243 case histories in which regulators brought enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation. These comparisons allow us to identify, measure, and estimate the economic importance of four features of each database that affect inferences from empirical tests. We show the extent to which each database is subject to these concerns and offer suggestions for researchers using these databases.