Recent research into the uses of accounting as a technology of government has used Foucault's notion of “counter‐conduct” to shed light on various ways in which the governed can seek to alter the regimes to which they are subjected. This paper unpacks the notion of counter‐conduct further in order to develop a clearer conceptualization of how regimes of government can change over time, with or without clearly identifiable attempts by the governed to influence such changes. We develop our argument based on a longitudinal field study of sustainable waste management practices in a municipality in the English East Midlands. We track the municipality's attempts to become more sustainable in the context of an evolving central government performance management regime that went through a series of legislative and administrative iterations—namely, Best Value, Comprehensive Performance Assessment, and Comprehensive Area Assessment. We conceptualize these iterations of central performance management and the related changes in local government practices and technologies of governing as a series of overlapping “modes of governing” (Bulkeley et al., 2007, Environment and Planning A , 39 (11), 2733–2753). We suggest that accounting research can benefit from the notion of modes of governing because it sheds light on the theoretically expected, but empirically underresearched, copresence of multiple rationales, programs, and technologies of governing, all operating at the same time.

The paper seeks to enhance our understanding of the interaction between the development of disciplinary power in western liberal society and Foucault's writings on governmentality, through examination of the political processes resulting from the largest public scandal in the UK, the Poulson scandal of the early 1970s. The first research motive is to uncover any additional insights or hidden understandings that can be derived by applying Foucauldian historiographical and governmental perspectives as strengthened by Dean's (2010) analytics of government to the history of corporate governance in English local authorities over the forty years following Poulson. We argue that the continual process of intervention, investigation and prescription by central government set in motion by the scandal resulted in an increase in disciplinary power within local government by changing the expectations of council officials, elected representatives and politicians in Westminster through the normalisation of these intrusions and the spirit of dependency and compliance which resulted. Secondly, the paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of the analytics approach in a complex situation involving many genealogical disruptions to the status quo over a long time-period; and whilst the paper found the method helpful, limitations emerged regarding its claims to empirical certainty through precise questioning. Finally, the paper examines the significance of countering corruption as a motivating factor in the rise of disciplinary power in English local government, which it finds as limited.