On the fiftieth birthday of my Foundations of Economic Analysis, a deluxe edition of it was embalmed in the German Klassiker der Nationalokonomie series alongside of Adam Smith, Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, Irving Fisher, and many other illustrious suspects. With it, as customary, was published a slim volume in German, a Vademecum, with review essays by Jurg Niehans, Carl-Christian von Weizsacker, and a foreword by the editor Bertram Schefold. By invitation, like Tom Sawyer at his own funeral, I provided for German translation my own recollections under the title "How Foundations Came to Be." Here is the English original, slightly abridged; for some technicalities, readers are referred to the full German text. I remembered much, and, with the perspective of time, learned not a little.

A FLAGRANT ERROR dogged James Steuart, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Barton, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, and classical writers generally. Modern commentators on classicism are enough tempted by the fallacy to generally overlook it as a vital flaw in the earlier writers. This fallay can be called classically classical-not in the sense of being the greatest error in the classical paradigm (an award that would be hard even to define) but-in the sense that modern scholars ignorant of pre-1900 literature would be little tempted by it. I do not denigrate or patronize a great writer of the past, such as David Ricardo, when I objectively delineate his hits and misses. The fallacy can be simply put. Fixed capitals are prejudicial to wages and the demand for labor; circulating capitals (wage fund items that represent outlays paid to workers at the beginning of a period of production, which are not recouped until the end of that period of production and which of course bear an interest or profit rate during the transition) are allegedly favorable to the real rate and to the demand for labor. Fixed capitals are durable produced inputs that render their services over a number of different production periods. Circulating capitals are produced inputs used up within one period of production; they are relatable to, but distinguishable from, wage fund advances paid to workers at the beginning of a period of production, to be recouped at its end along with an interest or profit return. In the minds of heterodox economists and the lay public generally, a technological change that made machinery newly viable was supposedly the kind of invention that could put people out of work temporarily, reduce market-clearing rates, and in long-run equilibrium at an unchanged subsistence rate call for a significantly reduced population. By contrast, therefore, a new invention that displaced machinery in favor of various raw materials as inputs, would supposedly raise the short-run real and increase the demand for labor. So powerful was the grip of what I shall dub the Classical Fallacy that it was being reminded of it in 1819-21 that appears to have enabled Ricardo to recant, in his famous Third Edition chapter on machinery, his previous boner that every viable invention can be expected to raise every factor's return. From today's wisdomor indeed the wisdom of 1900-that previous position of Ricardo was nonsense. There is no Invisible Hand that seeks out machines or new techniques only if they benefit everyone.I

Here is how the 1817 Ricardo comparative advantage trade benefit analysis has to be modified to take account of post-1960 Sraffian benefits from capital-using technologies. By bringing J. S. Mill's demand model up to date in terms of its implicit geometric-mean money-metric utility, specific measurements for real net national product are calculated to partition sources of welfare gains (from output enhancements and taste-preference accommodations) in scenarios of (1) trade between equals, (2) trade between poor and rich nations, and (3) for biased inventions that enable a poor country to take over production of items in which formerly the rich place enjoyed comparative advantage. History of economic doctrine is mined to advance today's frontier of scientific knowledge—a forward-looking function for “Whig history.”

It is high praise when so expert a * scholar as Samuel Hollander (1980) hails my canonical classical model (1978) as likely to become locus classicus for the next generation of textbook writers. Like Fletcher I care not who makes a nation's laws if I can shape its textbook writers' songs. But with power comes responsibility. I must weigh and respond to the doubts Dr. Hollander raises about some positions I took in the three-seventeenths of my positivistic text that digresses to interpret particular historical controversies. I shall be brief and deal only with most essential points.

THE St. Petersburg paradox constitutes a fascinating chapter in the history of ideas. What other subject can link together Edward Gibbon and the father-inlaw of Thomas Mann? Or can, in the conceit of Maynard Keynes, link together the Bernoullis and Darwin?' Substantively, the Petersburg paradox served as a dramatic paradigm, alerting people to the fact that their utility of gain exceeded their utility of equivalent money lost. As a byproduct, the discussion generated an interest of its own: the idiocies it evoked from various writers are scarcely less fascinating than the lasting insights. Yet when I came recently to review the matter, I found to my surprise that no one seems to have provided anything like a complete survey of the subject. The standard sources provide us with tantalizing glimpses: the useful 1954 English translation of the classic Latin work of Daniel Bernoulli [4, 1738]; the references and discussion in histories of probability, such as those of Isaac Todhunter [39, 1865] and Leonid Maistrov [17, 1966]; the selective but perspicacious accounts in the work of Keynes [15, 1921] and George Stigler [37, 1950]; the new lease on life given to the subject by Karl Menger [19, 1934] with the discussion there of SuperPetersburg paradoxes creatable when the utility function is unbounded; the recent observation by Kenneth Arrow [2, 1971] that not all stochastic processes can be ordered by the expected value of their utility outcomes when such Mengerian super-paradoxes are allowed to exist. The number of post-Mengerian writers is large, including L. S. Shapley [36, 1972], D. L. Brito [6, 1975], Samuelson [28, 1960], Robert J. Aumann [3, 1975], and many others. Given my own limited linguistic abilities and leisure time, I have not been able to provide anything like a definitive survey, one that checks back on and quotes copiously from the original sources. After all, the list of writers connected with the St. Petersburg paradox reads like a veritable who's who in probability and the social sciences. Here is but a sample: Nicholas Bernoulli (1687-1759), Montmort (1678-1719), Gabriel Cramer (1704IThe continuity and oneness of modern European thought may be illustrated, if such things amuse the reader, by the reflection that Condorcet derived from Bernoulli, that Godwin was inspired by Condorcet, that Malthus was stimulated by Godwin's folly into stating his famous doctrine, and that from the reading of Malthus on Population Darwin received his earliest impulse [15, Keynes, 1921, p. 83, n. 1].

THE TIME is ripe for a fresh, modern look at the concept of complementarity. Whatever the intrinsic merits of the concept, forty years ago it helped motivate Hicks and Allen to perform their classical reconsideration of ordinal demand theory. And, as I hope to show, the last word has not yet been said on this ancient preoccupation of literary and mathematical economists. The simplest things are often the most complicated to understand fully. For this reason, I have redrafted the present paper along the following lines: The main discussion is primarily literary. Then comes a mathematical section. Finally, I give a brief survey of the history of the subject.