We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the European interbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find that banks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease their credit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger for firms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannot compensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, the impact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks. Finally, we find no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity but instead higher hoarding of liquidity.

Abstract We analyze the credit supply and real effects of bank bail-ins by exploiting the unexpected failure and subsequent resolution of a major Portuguese bank. Using loan-level data, we show that while firms more exposed to the bail-in suffered a significant contraction of credit at the intensive margin, they were on average able to compensate for the supply-driven shock. However, affected SMEs experienced a binding reduction of funds available through credit lines, and those with lower internal liquidity increased precautionary cash holdings and reduced investment and employment. Our results highlight the trade-off policymakers face when considering this new bank resolution mechanism.

We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the European interbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find that banks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease their credit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger for firms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannot compensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, the impact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks. Finally, we find no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity but instead higher hoarding of liquidity.