Knowledge that Transforms

We examine changes in bank loan contracts after borrowers experience a nearby local newspaper closure. Compared to a sample of control firms, we find that the closure of a local newspaper leads to higher interest spreads for borrowers. This effect is more pronounced when there are fewer related lenders in the syndicate, when lenders have less prior lending experience in the local area, when the closed local newspapers are associated with increases in misconduct cases, and for institutional lenders who rely more heavily on others for monitoring. In addition, we observe that loan contract amendments become less frequent, while covenant strictness increases following newspaper closures. Our main findings are robust to various research design specifications and are not driven by deteriorating local economic conditions. Our findings suggest that local media still plays a significant role in the debt markets, even as society moves deeper into the internet era.

In 2008, the IRS added several schedules to Form 990, including Schedule R, related party transactions. Utilizing Schedule R, we investigate and descriptively document the existence of related parties and the types of transactions engaged in with those related parties. Then, to provide evidence of the usefulness of these disclosures, we tie into the literature on financial reporting quality. Prior research into financial reporting quality shows that donors discount program ratios when a nonprofit organization reports zero fundraising expenses, implying that they find reporting zero fundraising expenses to be a proxy for poor financial reporting quality. A plausible reason for organizations reporting zero fundraising expenses is that a related party conducts fundraising on the organization's behalf. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that when nonprofits disclose that fundraising services are provided by a related entity, they are more likely to report zero fundraising expenses. We also find that disclosure of related party fundraising mitigates donor discounting of the program ratio when zero fundraising expenses are reported. However, we only find that this mitigation occurs in nonprofits with sophisticated donors. In sum, we find evidence consistent with donors—in particular, sophisticated donors—using disclosures provided in Form 990 to supplement the amounts recognized. Our findings demonstrate the importance of, and are consistent with the use of, these related party disclosures. On a broader level, these findings provide insight into how thoroughly donors are willing to review Form 990 to get information relevant to their donation decision.

We examine the association between target firms' public non‐GAAP earnings disclosures and merger and acquisition (M&A) efficiency. This research question is important, given the widespread use of non‐GAAP metrics in M&A valuation and lack of evidence regarding the real effects of non‐GAAP disclosure. Public non‐GAAP disclosure can enhance bidders' ability to assess a target's core earnings and potential synergy, especially in the earlier stages of due diligence, and enable bidders to make better M&A decisions. We find that target firms' non‐GAAP disclosures are associated with greater M&A efficiency, greater synergies, and lower likelihood of post‐acquisition goodwill impairment. We also find some evidence that target firms' non‐GAAP disclosures are positively related to post‐acquisition operating performance. Further, we find modest evidence that the positive relation between non‐GAAP disclosures and M&A efficiency is stronger (1) for targets that are more difficult to value, (2) for targets with weaker information environments, and (3) when targets' non‐GAAP numbers are of higher quality. Overall, our evidence suggests that non‐GAAP disclosures help facilitate efficient resource allocation in M&As and are associated with real effects on corporate investment. Our evidence is potentially relevant to regulators' concerns about the usefulness of non‐GAAP metrics.

This paper examines how a change in disclosure regulation influences investors' information acquisition and trading across multiple markets. We leverage the 2007 elimination of the Form 20‐F reconciliation requirement for cross‐listed firms that prepare financial statements under IFRS. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, we show that investors acquire fewer Form 20‐Fs of IFRS‐reporting cross‐listed firms when these forms are not filed in a timely manner relative to the home‐country earnings announcement. We also find an increased acquisition of earnings‐specific 6‐Ks, indicating a shift in investor attention from delayed and unreconciled 20‐Fs to more timely earnings releases in the home country. Furthermore, we find that American Depositary Receipt (ADR) market reactions to local earnings announcements increase after the deregulation, especially for firms with strong home‐country institutions. In addition, we find that the deregulation increases return co‐movement between the US ADR market and the home‐country stock market for IFRS filers' shares. Our results bring novel insights regarding the cross‐market impact of the disclosure regulation change.

How do global firms manage conflicting constituencies in complex markets? The Big 4 accounting firms have expanded their size and scope to the extent that they need to relate to different constituencies simultaneously, sometimes on controversial issues. This is particularly relevant given their engagement in aggressive tax planning services alongside their traditional professional obligations, as this generates a conflict between discretion offered to “offshore” clients and accountability offered to other stakeholders. This requires strategic duplicity—sending differentiated signals to different stakeholders. We suggest that firms use organizational partitioning across legal structures and geographies to enable strategic duplicity. We test this by collecting a unique data set on the Big 4's ownership structures and staff numbers across all locations, showing that their organizations are heavily segmented. We show that the Big 4 use this geographical and legal differentiation to send contrasting signals to constituents about their organizations, engaging in a type of strategic duplicity that we term transparency arbitrage, in which “onshore” stakeholders receive a signal of transparency and “offshore” stakeholders receive a signal of discretion. This duality enables them to engage in controversial issues with conflicting stakeholders.

This study provides empirical evidence that key audit matters (KAMs) are informative for future negative accounting outcomes. We employ FinBERT—a deep learning model designed for natural language processing that allows human‐like text comprehension—to demonstrate that goodwill‐related KAMs are predictive of firms' future impairments. Our findings reveal that utilizing KAMs as a stand‐alone predictor for future impairments provides meaningful predictive power. By exploring the semantic content of reported KAMs, we find that their predictive power is primarily driven by text passages covering how both the firm and the auditor exercise judgment in the accounting and auditing of goodwill. Furthermore, we show that KAMs are incrementally predictive beyond several firm‐level determinants and disclosures in annual reports. Finally, our additional analyses indicate that (1) KAM‐predicted impairment probabilities are relevant to capital markets, (2) KAMs are useful for predicting the magnitude of goodwill impairments, and (3) the predictive power extends to other KAM topics. Collectively, our findings enhance the understanding of the informational content of KAMs, which is a key rationale for their introduction.

This study examines the association between firm performance and promotion incentives (i.e., the product of vertical pay disparity and promotion probability) in multilayer corporate tournaments using a unique data set of Korean public firms. We dissect the corporate tournament into layers and separately examine their association with firm performance while also accounting for the role of promotion probability. We find that (1) upper‐layer, rather than lower‐layer, tournaments are the main drivers of the positive association between vertical pay disparity and firm performance and (2) this association becomes stronger with higher promotion probability, consistent with tournament theory, but only in the upper layer. These results are more pronounced in settings where tournament incentives are plausibly more important, such as those characterized by high labor productivity and high average tenure. Our study draws a comprehensive picture of the corporate tournaments that simultaneously accounts for various factors that previous studies have examined only in isolation.

This study examines whether and how brokers manage the distribution of their stock recommendations. We document that if a broker's percentage of buy recommendations in a quarter is substantially higher than its target level, the broker issues significantly fewer buy recommendations than other brokers in the following quarter. This evidence remains robust after controlling for mean reversion in the data and varies systematically with brokers' expected benefits and costs of managing the distribution. Exploring possible methods to manage the distribution, we find evidence suggesting that brokers alter the timing of recommendation initiations and reiterations, and shift recommendations between adjacent quarters. Finally, we show that distribution management affects the informativeness of stock recommendations in the market.

In three experiments, we examine how the widespread phenomenon of overwithholding affects retirement savings and how the additional option at tax time of saving retroactively for retirement affects total savings levels. Our results show that overwithholding significantly reduces retirement savings. We show that this outcome can be explained by individuals' anchoring on their take‐home pay when making savings decisions and by individuals' reduced motivation to save in the presence of overwithholding. Moreover, we find that the introduction of an additional retroactive savings option at tax time increases overall savings by providing information about the correct after‐tax income and by emphasizing the importance of a savings norm that nudges individuals to save. Furthermore, our findings demonstrate that immediate taxation (back‐loaded retirement plans) results in greater effective savings than deferred taxation (front‐loaded retirement plans), irrespective of whether there is overwithholding or the existence of an additional option to save. Policy‐makers may therefore consider both the introduction of an additional savings option at tax time and immediate taxation as policy tools to encourage retirement saving.

We examine whether audit partner individualism reduces earnings comparability in the United States. We argue that individualistic audit partners are more likely to deviate from internal working rules and allow clients more flexibility in making accounting choices, consequently decreasing their clients' earnings comparability. Using a novel partner‐level measure of individualism, we find that within individual Big 4 audit firms, earnings are less comparable between a company audited by an individualistic partner and a company audited by a non‐individualistic partner, relative to a pair of companies that are each audited by a non‐individualistic partner. Our inferences are robust to a changes analysis, a falsification test, and a propensity score matching procedure. We also find that the effect of partner individualism is less salient when the audit firm is under more stringent regulatory monitoring and when clients are more important, but more salient when individualistic partners are more confident about being different. Further analyses suggest that our main inferences are robust to controlling for differences in partners' cultural backgrounds and using client‐pairs audited by the same audit partner. Collectively, our study provides novel evidence on the role of auditor individualism in earnings comparability.