This study examines whether clients' business strategies are a factor in determining the occurrence of financial reporting irregularities and the level of audit effort. We use the organizational strategy theory of Miles and Snow to develop a comprehensive measure of business strategy using publicly available data. We find that Miles and Snow's Prospector strategy is more likely to be involved in financial reporting irregularities and generally requires greater audit effort. The business strategy measure also appears to capture client business risk and provides incremental explanatory power beyond the individual measures of client complexity or risk used in traditional audit fee models. We contribute to the literature by constructing a replicable business strategy measure and identifying organizational business strategy as an important ex ante determinant of financial reporting irregularities and levels of audit effort. Our results suggest that investigating how audits can be improved to reduce financial reporting irregularities among Prospector clients is an important area for audit practice and future research.

We provide evidence that some managers use a multi‐period, coordinated strategy involving inflated current‐period discretionary accruals and optimistic forecasts of future earnings to delay the revelation of bad news. Inflating discretionary accruals increases investor expectations of future performance, and issuing optimistic earnings forecasts of future earnings supports the inflated accruals and extends the horizon for managers to benefit. This strategy is more pronounced for firms that engage in earnings management outside of GAAP, suggesting intentional behavior. Our evidence indicates that managers use this coordinated strategy when firms experience significant bad news and cannot delay revealing all of the bad news through accrual management. We also find that managers use this coordinated strategy when focusing on short‐term performance due to career concerns (i.e., dismissal) or retirement or when they have shorter stock option vesting schedules, which motivates them to inflate investor expectations for shorter‐term personal benefits. Furthermore, managers using this strategy do not hold deep in the money exercisable stock options, which is consistent with managers' private assessment of a higher (lower) likelihood of releasing bad (good) news in the future.